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Summary  
Biometric systems vary widely in their set-up, architecture and purpose 
(security, convenience, forensic etc.). The objective of this deliverable is a 
proof of concept for a trusted authentication system that uses biometrics in a 
divided control scheme. In this scheme the biometric data is encapsulated in a 
personal token controlled by the user but the implementation of the biometric 
processing is in the tamper resistant token is controlled by the operator. The 
proof of concept is achieved through a practical application of a distributed 
biometric authentication and transaction verification system in a field test setup 
to demonstrate the usability of the theoretical framework elaborated in D3.10. 
The field test is based on a small but still representative sample of users from 
different European countries. The test participants are authenticated through 
their biometrics without any disclosure of biometric data to an operator 
(application of the proportionality principle). 
The theoretical basis for this demonstrator system is based on the divided 
control model using encapsulated biometric data and processing that has been 
described in D3.10. This implementation was recommended as preferred model 
for privacy-enhancing biometric applications. It relies on functional 
requirements in terms of conformity with the existing legal privacy framework 
and recommendations for biometric systems in the EU and in Switzerland. This 
field test serves as experimental verification of the theoretical models. FIDIS 
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1 Executive  Summary 
 
In previous deliverables (D3.2, D3.10) the FIDIS consortium elaborated a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for the use of biometrics in compliance with technological possibilities, 
legal constraints, ergonomic expectations and economic feasibilities. The advantages and 
disadvantages of different architectural and conceptual models have been evaluated under the 
above aspects. A critical point in all implementations is the storage and the control of the 
biometric reference data of the enrolled biometric subjects. Two models have been forwarded 
as recommendations for best practice implementations of the storage and usage of the 
biometric data for the enrolment and recognition processes. 
In the shared control model biometric data are stored in a centralised or distributed database, 
under the control of different organisations that supervise the biometric processing to be 
compliant with the proportionality principle for personal data processing. Such models with 
access to all reference templates in the recognition process may be necessary to guarantee the 
uniqueness of the identity claimed by the biometric subject. Such implementations are 
necessary to prevent individuals from using several identities in a certain application context. 
In the divided control model the biometric data are stored and processed in a personal device 
provided or accepted by the organisation that requests authentication through a biometric 
recognition. Thus the processing itself is controlled by the organisation but the biometric data 
and the usage of the device is controlled by the individual subject. The biometric data and 
processing is encapsulated in the personal device and never leaves the device and no 
biometric information besides the fact that a certain recognition process was successful is 
disclosed to the operator or a third party. Systems based on models with encapsulated 
biometrics guarantee the uniqueness of a biometric subject that may claim a certain identity. 
They cannot guarantee that a certain individual has an unique identity. Thus they are not 
suitable for forensic applications. But implementations based on the divided control model are 
recommended for the protection of the identity of individuals from theft or abuse. The 
preferred implementation is in a user centric Personal Identity Management Assistant (PIMA) 
device. 
The purpose of this deliverable is to check the technical feasibility, the organisational 
practicability and the user acceptance of the divided control model within a field test. Such a 
test is indicated as the usage of a biometric device is still new for most persons and thus the 
acceptance is not granted by itself. In addition the best ergonomics of a biometric device used 
by individuals in the field is not yet known and user may be reluctant to such a personalized 
model with an initial usage learning threshold. These open points of the recommended 
implementation model have to be elucidated in practice with an existing PIMA. Such a credit 
card sized device with encapsulated biometrics is built by one of the FIDIS partner 
organisation (AXS Internet Passport). In the field test the device was distributed to a selected 
sample of 30 test persons from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It was 
used to protect their OpenID identifiers previously established by the test persons. The 
OpenID is a widely accepted Internet identity credential that allows accessing various 
accepting web sites with the same authentication process. Also the access to the FIDIS 
internal web site is available for OpenID identifiers.  FIDIS 
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The field test lasted for 4 months starting at begin of the year 2009. All test persons 
performed the initial enrolment of their biometrics into the AXS Internet Passports and the 
initial binding of their card with the OpenID identifier provided by a Swiss OpenID operator 
without additional help or support. These settings for the field test simulate a realistic 
distribution process of such an encapsulated PIMA for commercial applications. The test 
persons reported their personal concerns about the usage of biometrics and their real life 
experience with the mean of a questionnaire and with personal comments. 
In parallel to the practical field test all legal constraints for the application of biometrics in 
such a usage model have been carefully evaluated for all four countries in which field test 
persons were involved. The various data protection laws request in most cases a special 
treatment of biometric data and the consent of the biometric subjects. Additional requirements 
have been fulfilled by specific contracts for the test operators and a consent form for the test 
persons. 
The result of the test shows that the divided control model is accepted by the majority of the 
test persons. But a certain reluctance towards biometric recognition remains present within a 
about a third of the test population. The practical test showed that ergonomic aspects are 
predominant for the user experience and convenience is in most cases higher rated than 
security even for biometric applications. It is an intrinsic fact of any biometric system that the 
most critical process is the initial enrolment and thus the establishment of reference templates. 
The later performance of the biometric recognition processes heavily depend on the quality of 
these initial reference data. In the field test this most critical step was done by the 
inexperienced user right after he or she received the device. The enrolment process therefore 
caused the highest level of non satisfaction and frustration within the field test user 
community. The application of the divided control model using a PIMA that is distributed to 
inexperienced users has to plan the initial enrolment process very carefully to avoid poor 
performance and user frustration. The field test however also showed that the learning curve 
for the use of a personal biometric device is very steep. Almost all users claimed to have no 
usage problems in the subsequent authentication processes once they completed the 
enrolment. In general the understanding of the constraints of an authentication protocol based 
on a biometric measurement is not high even in the IT educated population.  
The conclusion of the field test is that the divided control model is apt for applications where 
the identities of individuals have to be protected. The ergonomic design of the PIMA device 
and of the enrolment protocol is crucial for the user acceptance and the system performance. 
The legal aspects of a deployment of a biometric system have to be carefully evaluated and 
are different from country to country. In general the divided control model bears less legal 
problems than systems with centralised biometric data storage. Taking all aspects into account 
the used implementation of biometrics in a system-on-card model with divided control can be 
considered as best practice for secure and privacy protecting biometric authentication in E-
commerce applications. 
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2 Introduction 
2.1  Overview of the document 
This report discusses the way biometrics can be applied for the purpose of biometric user 
recognition in the verification mode
1 in real life systems in accordance with all requests 
coming from data protection and privacy considerations. The findings of the report describe 
the goals, the setup and the result of a practical field test using a device that verifies the 
legitimacy of its user through fingerprint recognition.  
In the introduction the recommended implementation of biometrics as described in a previous 
Fidis deliverable [Fidis310] is recapitulated with emphasis on the practical implications 
coming from the legal, technical and privacy protection requirements. An important enabler 
or disabler of biometric applications is the reliability, the ergonomics and the economics of 
the biometric verification process in an identity based application. All these aspects are, at 
least partially, covered by the setup and concept of the field test. The applied methods are 
described in the last section of the introduction. 
The third chapter describes the concrete outcomes of the field test that shall emerge from the 
evaluation process of the test results. The used instruments for the test data acquisition, the 
protection of the participants of the field test and the legal framework are presented. In the 
first part of the chapter a detailed description of the field test setup and especially of the 
processing architecture of the underlying authentication system is presented with emphasis on 
the implemented biometrics. In the second part of the chapter we present the standards and 
constraints from a legal point of view that governs the realisation of the field test. 
The following chapter describes the realization of the field test with the applied test protocol 
and the collection of the raw data.  
One chapter is dedicated to the observations made by the participants during the field test and 
the evaluation of the collected data. The summary data are extracted from the returned 
questionnaires, the comments of the tester and the observed usage of the test device during the 
field test period. 
The report ends with a final conclusion comparing the practical results with the principal 
findings and recommendations of the previous Fidis report D3.10 [Fidis310]. 
In the annex the used questionnaires, the compiled responses, the usage statistics and the legal 
framework documents are attached to allow further evaluation of the data and further usage of 
the legal models developed for the purpose of the field test but with a more general 
application potential. 
 
                                                 
1 In biometrics two operational modes are defined: In the verification mode a biometric subject claims a certain 
identity and his biometric data sample are just compared with the reference template that corresponds to the 
claimed identity. In the identification mode a subject delivers just a biometric data sample that then is compared 
with all other samples in the database to define his identity. In the limiting case that only one person is registered 
in the database, for instance in a personal token, the two modes become the same [Fidis310]. FIDIS 
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2.2  Fidis recommended implementations of biometrics 
In the report D3.10 Biometrics in Identity Management [Fidis310] several aspects concerning 
security of the biometric data, privacy protection in connection with biometrics and request on 
biometric systems from legal and ergonomic considerations have been discussed. The 
differences, the threats but also the advantages of biometric applications compared to 
traditional authentication methods have been presented. The main findings were 
  A clear distinction of the different operation modes is necessary. It is relevant whether  
a biometric system operates in the identification or in the verification mode. The 
identification mode applied to many individuals automatically requests some 
centralised processing of biometric data. The collected biometric data captured from 
individuals have to be compared with all previously stored reference templates to 
decide if the biometric subject corresponds to some registered individual. In the 
verification mode however more distributed architectures with local capture and 
processing of biometric data are possible as the actual captured biometric sample data 
has only to be compared with a clearly identified reference template of the individual 
that claims a certain identity. The two modes, identification and verification, merge in 
the case of a system that recognises only one individual. Such a system can be 
implemented in a mobile device that represents an identifier for a partial identity of an 
individual. If the biometric data in addition is securely protected inside the device we 
speak about encapsulated biometrics. 
  An intrinsic problem of the application of biometric methods in the recognition of 
individuals is the occurrence of measurement and evaluation errors. Such errors may 
lead to a false acceptance of an individual to have a certain identity or to the false 
rejection of an individual negating his true identity. For practical applications of a 
biometric system it is important to distinguish between the technical notion of false 
matching (FMR) or false non matching rates (FNMR) that characterises the 
performance of a certain biometric system for the comparison of one captured query 
template with one stored reference template and the notion of false acceptance (FAR) 
and false rejection rate (FRR) that characterises the performance of the full 
recognition process with all steps until a system makes the final acceptance or 
rejection decision. For a given biometric system the correlated relation between the 
FMR and the FNMR are represented by the ROC curve (Receiver Operation 
Characteristics). The performance parameter (FRR, FAR) of a biometric recognition 
system may deviate by orders of magnitude from the corresponding technical values 
depending on the recognition protocol, e.g. when several capture attempts are allowed 
before a final decision is taken or when the comparison process uses several reference 
templates covering the intrinsic variations of the single measurement processes. The 
relevant values for a practical implementation are always the FRR and the FAR, the 
FNMR and the FMR have only a technical importance as they define the principal 
recognition potential of a certain biometric method. 
  A further problem of the collection of biometric data is the limited possibility to 
revoke or change void data. Biometric data often remain linked to the delivering 
individual during his whole lifetime and the raw data may even disclose health related 
information [Fidis310]. This quality of biometric data may generate an inacceptable 
hazard to the privacy of individuals and therefore biometric systems should be 
designed in a way that such threats on the biometric data are avoided. For this a 
classification grid for biometric systems has been developed that classifies biometric FIDIS 
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systems according their control scheme. The most important criterion of the 
classification is the possession of control over the collected biometric data and the 
possession of control over the processing protocol and algorithms. Depending on the 
field of applications different control schemes (operator control, shared or divided 
control, user control) are possible. The legal principle of proportionality applied on the 
collection and processing of biometric data leads to the recommendation to favour 
control schemes that limit the disclosure of biometric raw data to the operator 
whenever possible. One scheme that realizes this request is the divided control model 
where the operator controls the processing method and protocol and the user controls 
the biometric data and the capture of these data. A system with encapsulated 
biometrics is in accordance with this preferred control model. There are however 
situations where a centralised control is unavoidable. Such cases especially occur in 
forensic applications or in applications where identities have to be mapped on 
individuals (necessity of negative identification proving that an individual has not a 
claimed identity or detection of multiple identities established by an individual for 
fraudulent purposes). 
  For practical applications based on biometric authentication the convenience for the 
user and the cost effectiveness for the operator are very important. The 
implementation of biometric systems must take these constraints into account. 
Actually biometrics bear the potential for an enhanced user convenience for 
authentication processes as the user does not need to perform in cumbersome 
protocols linked to some personal secret, like PIN or long passwords combined with 
dedicated tokens with inserted smart cards or scratch lists. There are biometric 
methods like fingerprint or signature recognition that are well accepted by users and 
that have been technically developed in a way to allow a cost effective deployment. 
To really take advantage of a certain biometric authentication system its usage by 
different operator organisations would be highly beneficial. This for instance can be 
realised by integrating biometrics into a Personal Identity Management Assistant 
(PIMA) device of a user centric identity management system [Fidis31]. The user 
establishes authentic communication channels with all operators that accept his PIMA 
as an authenticating device. Such a user centric identity federation concept is realized 
by the AXS-Authentication System presented in the D3.10 report and used for the 
purpose of the field test. The PIMA in this system is the AXS Internet Passport with a 
fingerprint recognition System-on-Card that was also presented in the D3.10 report. 
The advantage for the user is that he does not need to learn different authentication 
procedures for each connection to another operator. The advantage for the accepting 
operator is that he does not need to roll out and handle an own authentication 
infrastructure with proprietary hardware devices and/or smart cards. He just can use 
the existing infrastructure already in the hand of the user to take advantage of the 
biometric authentication capability of the PIMA of the user. This model makes 
economical sense for the operator as he has only to cover marginal costs to participate 
in such a user centric authentication system (cost of the additional secure channel 
between him and the user). The total cost of a user centric identity management is 
shared among all participating organisations, the initial investment in the 
infrastructure is typically covered by ISP or telecom organisations. 
  In the same report the legal constraints for the application of biometric systems have 
been compiled and presented. As a crucial point evolves the proportionality principle 
which states that only user data should be collected by an operator that are mandatory FIDIS 
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for the specific application. Biometric data used to link a person to a specific identity 
or identity credential of a commercial application should be used in a very restrictive 
way so that no unintended and not consented use of such data is possible. The 
corresponding legal boundary conditions for the collection of biometric data thus can 
be very restrictive in certain countries. The legal findings relevant for the practical 
applications and especially for the field test in the four countries are entirely covered 
in the specific section below. 
One of the principal conclusions of D3.10 is that the best solution to solve the problem of 
information leakage from biometric data in templates and from the processing of captured 
biometric data is user control and encapsulation of the whole biometric system into a tamper 
resistant device. Such a system-on-card solution will be used for the field test.  
2.3  Field test environment - OpenID 
The general field test environment shall permit using the AXS Internet Passport in multiple 
applications and especially for the access to the internal Fidis homepage. To achieve this 
operational goal many sites that accept an authentication with the AXS Internet Passport have 
to be available. This condition is easily fulfilled if the AXS Internet Passport is combined 
with an OpenID [OpenID] Identifier. The OpenID standard
2 is a world wide single sign on 
scheme that follows a simple protocol: 
1.  In an initial step the user has to enrol at an OpenID Identity Provider. For this he 
delivers a set of identifying credentials, agrees with the provider on an authentication 
procedure and receives from him the OpenID Identifier which is basically an URL that 
links to the authentication procedure of the OpenID Identity Provider 
(OpenIDprovider). 
2.  To authenticate at the site of an acceptor, called relying party, of the OpenID Identifier 
the following authentication protocol runs: 
a.  The user requests access to the Web Site of the relying party that offers 
authentication via an OpenID Identifier 
b.  The user enters his OpenID Identifier into the OpenID login form of the 
relying party  
c.  The relying party transforms the OpenID identifier into a canonical URL form 
and request this URL to connect him with the OpenID identity Provider 
                                                 
2 Wikipedia explains the OpenID standard as follows: 
“OpenID is an open, decentralized standard for user authentication and access control, allowing users to log onto 
many services with the same digital identity. As such, it replaces the common login process that uses a login-
name and a password, by allowing a user to log in once and gain access to the resources of multiple software 
systems.  
An OpenID is in the form of a unique URL, and is authenticated by the user's 'OpenID provider' (that is, the 
entity hosting their OpenID URL). The OpenID protocol does not rely on a central authority to authenticate a 
user's identity. Since neither the OpenID protocol nor Web sites requiring identification may mandate a specific 
type of authentication, non-standard forms of authentication can be used, such as smart cards, biometrics, or 
ordinary passwords. 
OpenID authentication is used and provided by several large websites. Organizations like AOL, BBC, Google, 
IBM, Microsoft, MySpace, Orange, PayPal, VeriSign, Yandex, Ustream and Yahoo! act as providers.” FIDIS 
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d.  The relying party and the OpenID Identity Provider establish a secure 
communication channel and the relying party then connects the access 
requesting user directly to the OpenID Provider authentication server. 
e.  The OpenID Identity Provider authenticates the user by the means he has 
implemented; in the case of the field test setup this is the AXS-Authentication 
System where the user needs the Internet Passport. 
f.  Upon correct authentication of the user the OpenID Identity Provider redirects 
the user to the web site of the relying party. In parallel he delivers some 
identifying user credentials for the relying party over the established secure 
channel. 
g.  Upon reception the relying party grants the user access to his resources. 
The sent credentials identifying the user may include some or all of the credentials that the 
OpenID Identity Provider collected during the initial establishment of the user account when 
he delivered the OpenID identifier. The fact that this credential delivery could be considered 
as a privacy hazard is not relevant for the findings of the field test as it is a standard procedure 
of the OpenID scheme outside the sphere of influence of the field test definition. Furthermore 
most OpenIDproviders allow the user to choose which data should be transferred to the 
relying party - at least the Swiss Identity Provider Clavid that has been elected for the field 
test provides this option.  
 FIDIS 
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3  Field test objectives and instruments 
The purpose of the field test is to check  
  the technical feasibility of a robust and stable implementation of encapsulated 
biometrics in a personal device with divided control of the biometrics,  
  the acceptance of the user to use biometrics to authenticate towards such a personal 
device,  
  the ergonomics of the used AXS Internet Passport and the user felt performance of the 
biometric authentication process and  
  the user demand for such an authentication scheme applicable in multiple contexts.  
3.1  Evaluation goals and instruments 
The specific goals are the elicitation of 
  the user concern and beliefs in relation with the privacy of biometric data in an 
encapsulated biometric system  
  the user requests on convenience for authentication systems 
  the general attitude of users towards biometric authentication in civil applications 
  the security consciousness of the user when he submits sensitive data over the Internet 
  the ability to correctly perform a biometric enrolment outside of a environment with 
supervised guidance 
  the understanding to use a PIMA with biometrics in multiple application settings  
  the willingness to learn new technical operations for the purpose of authentication and  
  the legal constraints and boundary conditions. 
3.2  Description of the AXS-Authentication System (AXS-AS) 
The  AXS Authentication System
TM (AXS-AS) is an authentication management 
infrastructure that allows the delivery of identity based services over the Internet. The AXS 
AS includes the following functional components:  
  AXS Internet Passport 
PIMA that can read encrypted messages sent by a server directly from a computer 
screen of a local Internet access device (PC, PDA, phone etc) through an optical 
interface. It displays the message content upon biometric authentication of the user to 
assure that only the legitimate user has access to the message. The Internet Passport 
has 112 free preinitialised channels for connections to various business applications 
that accept the AXS-AS for identity assurance services. 
  AXS Integration Link (AXS-IL) 
Interfacing SW components installed in the Business Application of the identity based 
value service Provider. The AXS-IL consists of the flickering code generator that 
transforms a binary message in a flickering code in the web browser of the user that 
can be read by the AXS Internet Passport. 
  AXS Security Manager (AXS-SM) server 
The AXS-SM server administers the secure channels between the business application 
of a service Provider and the AXS Internet Passports. Upon request of the business 
application through a Web Service call by the AXS-IL the AXS-SM server generates 
and delivers an encrypted message dedicated to a specific AXS Internet Passport. The FIDIS 
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message is then forwarded by the web server of the business application to the user 
Internet access device in form of a flickering code. An AXS-SM server may provide 
secure channels for an unlimited number of business applications and Internet 
Passports. The AXS-SM server is typically operated by an identity service operator. 
  AXS Credential Manager (AXS-CM) 
The AXS-CM server distributes the initial credentials (keys) for the opening of secure 
channels between card and provider to the AXS-SM servers that are attached to it. It 
receives these initial credentials for all cards that are distributed over its domain of 
attached servers and business application portals. Such a tree is called an AXS domain 
and the domain over which an AXS Internet Passport is distributed is called the home 
domain as the AXS-CM delivers the channel credentials for this card inside and 
outside the domain. The AXS-CM is operated by a broker which is typically a ISP or a 
telecom company with a network infrastructure.  
  AXS Domain Router (AXS-DR) 
The AXS-DR is a directory server that allows to identify the home domain of an AXS 
Internet Passport. When a user wants to use his Internet Passport with a business 
application of a Provider that is not attached to the tree of the card’s home domain the 
AXS-CM of this foreign tree has to ask for a credential to open a secure channel into 
the card at its home domain. The AXS-CM of the foreign domain identifies through 
the AXS-DR the home domain and requests from the corresponding AXS-CM a 
credential set to open a secure channel to the Internet Passport in question. This 
architecture allows a seamless roaming of the AXS Internet Passport between 
domains. For the user the AXS Internet Passport becomes a universally applicable 
PIMA. However certain brokers may restrict the roaming from and to their domain 
tree according their security policy.  
The domain tree and logical connection architecture is sketched in Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1: AXS-AS system architecture with components and indicated domain tree  FIDIS 
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The user's AXS Internet Passport offers a trusted display, independent from the local 
computing infrastructure. The AXS Security Manager software must be installed in the secure 
zone of an identity service operator. The AXS Integration Link interfaces to the identity 
management system of the service provider and calls the AXS-Security Manager over Web 
services. The Flickering Code Generator ( FCG) methods are integrated in the web 
presentation of the operator and transform the encrypted message in an optical code in the 
browser of the user’s Internet access device. The integration schematic is presented in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2: Integration of the AXS-AS in an existing IT infrastructure 
For the purpose of the field test the following functions in relation to the AXS-AS were 
defined 
  Provider of the identity assurance service is Clavid AG 
Clavid installed in their OpenID business application the workflow to initialse and use 
the AXS Internet Passport in connection with the OpenIDs provided by them.  
  Operator of the AXS Security Manager and Credential Manager server is AXSionics 
AXSionics has an own domain and operates such servers for various attached provider 
of identity based services and directly also for business application providers. 
An OpenID identity verification with the AXS Internet Passport consist of the following steps 
(bold printed steps are specific for the field test scheme): 
  The user types his OpenID identifier into the login page of an OpenID acceptor 
(relying party) 
  The acceptor (Relying Party) links the OpenID to the original OpenIDprovider which 
in this case is the Clavid server and connects the user to the OpenIDprovider  
  The Clavid server links the submitted OpenID identifier with the AXS Internet 
Passport number and request an authentication message 
  The OpenID verification process request an authentication credential from the 
user and displays the flickering code FIDIS 
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  The user reads with his AXS Internet Passport the flickering code, authenticates 
himself towards the card with his fingerprint biometrics and receives via card 
display the identity verification code 
  The user enters the one time code which is submitted to the AXS-SM server for 
verification 
  The AXS-SM server delivers the identity verification result to the OpenID 
identification server  
  The OpenID application forwards the identity credentials to the OpenID acceptor 
(Relying Party) 
  According the result the acceptor (Relying Party) grants access to the user.  
The operational architecture for the OpenID verification protocol of the field test is presented 
in Fig 3. 
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Figure 3: Combination of the OpenID scheme with the AXS-AS  
3.2.1  The AXS Internet Passport 
The principal component of the AXS-AS is the AXS Internet Passport. It is a credit card 
shaped Personal Identity Management Assistant (PIMA) that receives messages over an 
optical interface, recognises it’s owning user through a 1-, 2 or 3-factor authentication 
protocol and informs its user over an integrated graphical display.  
For this it has a fingerprint sweep sensor that serves also as input pad to enter for instance a 
PIN code. The card has an optical interface with 6 channels that reads flickering messages 
from any screen displays. It informs the user over an internal graphical OLED display with a 
resolution of 128 (W) x 96 (H) pixels. It has in addition a Mini-USB 2.0 interface that serves 
on one side to reload the accumulator of the token (reload necessary after approx. 200 
transactions).. The token is started and stopped by pressing the power button. 
One main novelty of the AXS AS is the optical interface. All tokens have this interface to 
read a flickering code displayed on the screen of the local client. The optical interface works 
with a wide variety of screens in almost any parameter settings. The bandwidth of the optical FIDIS 
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interface depends on the characteristics of the screen, the graphic card and the available 
graphic driver software of the local computer. A typical value is 150 baud (bits/sec). 
 
 
Figure 4: The AXS Internet Passport is a PIMA with a system-on-board biometrics, an 
optical interface for data input and graphical display for data output. 
All critical data and computations are embedded in the secure processing platform inside the 
card which is a certified
3 (CC EAL 4+) microprocessor with a SAM 7 architecture. The 
security processor executes the cryptographic operations in an integrated secure and fast 
crypto coprocessor. All data, also the biometric data are enclosed in the tamper resistant 
memory of the microprocessor. 
Another important novelty is the intrinsic user side identity federation capability. Each AXS 
Internet Passport has 128 preinstalled independent secured channels that can be activated to 
communicate with different service providers attached to any AXS-SM servers. This setting 
allows to use the AXS Internet Passport in principle for all identity based services a user 
wants to get access to. For the attachment to the OpenID Identifier only one of these channels 
was used. 
3.2.2  Characteristics of the biometrics in the AXS-AS 
The AXS Internet Passport adopts the divided control model for the biometric processing 
combined with an encapsulated implementation of the biometric procedures. The whole 
biometric processing is realised as system-on-card inside the AXS Internet Passport. The 
storage of the biometric reference templates, the measurement and the decision about the 
biometric application usage are under the sole control of the user. The way the data are 
processed and the recognition decision are under the control of the AXS-AS and thus the card 
issuing operator. Due to the encapsulated implementation of the data and the processing 
algorithms the user can not trick the card into a wrong authentication and therefore the 
operator still can trust the delivered result of the authentication process as long as the answer 
code that the user has to return is onetime and unique. On the other side the user knows that 
the full biometric process remains in his hand and the operator will never get access to his 
                                                 
3 Common Criteria is a standard for security certification of IT infrastructure. It defines different certification 
levels, so called Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALx). See http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/thecc.html FIDIS 
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biometric data. With this scheme the proportionality principle for personal data processing 
can be fulfilled even when biometric data are used for purely commercial applications. 
The whole implementation is protected in a tamper resistant processor in the AXS Internet 
Passport. Such an implementation reduces to a great extent the threats to the data or the 
processing of a biometric system often cited by critics. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scheme of the divided control model fora biometric system  
3.2.3  Security and functional requirements for the test environment 
For the field test the following usage requests were fulfilled: 
  Each user can establish an OpenID identifier and link it with his AXS Internet 
Passport in an easy way at the site of the OpenID Provider Clavid. 
  The provided OpenID identifier shall work with all or at least almost all OpenID 
accepting sites 
  The AXS authentication process shall start seamless right after the submission of the 
OpenID identifier into the login web page of an acceptor (Relying Party) 
  The user shall be able to unlink his OpenID from the AXS Internet Passport but the 
AXS Internet Passport will remain linked biometrically to him or her 
The following data protection and security measures were applied for the field test using 
OpenID and the AXS Internet Passport: 
  No name of testers will be recorded by the test organizer (with the exception of 
voluntary supplied Email addresses) 
  All statistical raw data collected during the field test are classified at the security level 
3 (only internal use at AXSionics). Only compiled statistics will be published 
  The test users were urged to chose a non speaking OpenID identifier name 
  The Relying Party (processor) will only collect the non personal OpenID identifier to 
make the access log statistics with success and failure log 
  After the end of the field test all statistical raw data at the processor and the controller 
and the test agent institutions will be discarded. Only compiled data will be kept for 
future research purposes. FIDIS 
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  All published statistical data are anonymized in the sense that no link between a user, 
the AXS Internet Passport number and the usage statistics can be reconstructed. 
The fulfilment of the usage and security requirements have been realised and tested before the 
start of the field test with the Fidis internal homepage as Relying Party, the OpenID Provider 
(Clavid) and AXSionics as the processing operator of the AXS-AS in the field test. 
A detailed user instruction has been produced to guide the user through the OpenID identifier 
ordering process, the personalization of the AXS Internet Passport, the link of the Passport 
with the OpenID identifier and the usage of the OpenID for the access to the Fidis web page. 
3.3  Legal and operational aspects of the biometric field test setup 
The legal compliance requirements were also an important aspect of the biometric field test 
setup. 
3.3.1 General     
Limitation of number of participating Fidis partners - For legal compliance purposes, the 
number of participating Fidis members has been limited and was restricted to the countries 
where the data protection legislation requirements could be managed with the help of the test 
agents. These test agents would coordinate some compliance aspects, such as the assistance to 
and the organisation of a notification to the data protection authorities if needed, the provision 
of information to the data subjects, the request for free, informed and specific consent and the 
collection of the anonymous questionnaires.  
For these reasons, the countries and test agents were the following : Germany, with test agent 
ICPP, Belgium, with test agent ICRI, the Netherlands with test agent TILT and Switzerland 
with test agent AXSionics. AXSionics combined this role of test agent with the responsibility 
of controller of the processing of personal data for the test (see below).   
Role of the test agents : no processing of data  - The test agent needed to identify a certain 
number of participants in their country for testing the AXS-Internet Passport (in connection 
with websites that use OpenID) and for filling in the questionnaire. The test agents would be 
more a contact person for the participants in the test. They did not process any data. They 
have only collected the questionnaires (in paper form) which were fully anonymous and not 
part of any file system and which they forwarded to AXSionics, the controller. The test agents 
had no access to any personal data whatsoever.  
Applicable law  - It was reviewed and concluded that in this set up, the data protection 
legislations of Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands would apply to the field 
test.  
3.3.2  Summary of the demonstrator set up and the applicable legislation 
The field test was organized by AXSionics established in Switzerland for test and research 
purposes. In particular the test included the evaluation of the proof of concept and the field 
demonstrator of the AXS Internet Passport on which biometric fingerprint would be locally 
stored for authentication (in particular verification) purposes of the user of the card, and the 
proper functioning of the related applications developed by AXSionics, in particular the 
interface between the card and the OpenID authentication application programs (which is 
available with Clavid), and user feedback (by questionnaires).  FIDIS 
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Personal data of the data subjects (who were the involved researchers and volunteers of Fidis 
partners) was limited: fingerprint (biometric) data stored and used on the card (under the 
control of the user), account data for the OpenID and communications on authentication 
attempts. AXSionics determined the means (i.e. the use of the AXS Internet Passport) and the 
purposes (i.e. validation of the demonstrator and the use of the AXS Internet Passport) of the 
use of personal data in the field tests. AXSionics was therefore the controller of the field tests.  
As a result, Swiss federal data protection
4 was applicable to the field test organized by 
AXSionics established in Switzerland where AXSionics would distribute in the framework of 
its activities AXS Internet Passports for the field test amongst its researchers.  
AXSionics also distributed AXS Internet Passports for the field test to researchers of the Fidis 
consortium partners in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany.  
Although AXSionics has no establishment in any of these countries, the possibility that the 
local data protection laws
5  apply to the deployment of the AXS Internet Passport in these 
countries was taken into account (see art. 4 1 c of the Directive 95/46/EC as implemented in 
the concerned member states
6). For this reason, it was also advised to limit the number of 
countries of the participating researchers. 
3.3.3 Brief recapitulation of some of the legal requirements complied 
with under the applicable legislation 
AXSionics had to comply with the above mention data protection legislations for the field 
tests and demonstrator.  
Without mentioning all legal requirements (reference is made to other relevant Fidis 
deliverables, including D3.2 and D3.6, and the texts of the national applicable laws), the most 
important requirements which are important for the practical preparation and compliance of 
the field test are summarized hereinafter.  
Legal basis : free, informed and specific consent - One of the legal basis on which the test 
could rely for the processing of personal data considering the context, is the free, specific and 
informed consent. Specific information is to be provided as specified in the applicable laws 
                                                 
4 The Swiss (federal) data protection legislation dates of 19 June 1992 (with important modifications entering 
into force on 1
st of January 2008) and is available in English at  
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/org/00828/index.html?lang=en and in German at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/2/235.1.de.pdf . 
5 The Belgian (federal) data protection legislation dates of 8 December 1992 (with modifications). An unofficial 
translation is available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm    
The German (federal) data protection legislation dates of 18 May 2001. An unofficial translation is available at  
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_029/nn_946430/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 
FederalDataProtectionAct,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/BundesdatenschutzgesetzFederalDataPr
otectionAct.pdf . The Dutch data protection legislation dates of 6 July 2000 and an unofficial translation is 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm  
6 Although is was agreed that the cards would become property of the data subjects in order to minimize the 
risks of data abuse, the cards are likely to remain 'equipment' used in Belgium, the Netherlands, etc; the question 
will remain whether this is for the use of AXSionics or the data subject ; because of the purposes of the test and 
the demonstrator, it will remain difficult to argue that these local data protection laws would not apply upon 
using the card (compare opinion about applicability of the laws on data processing with 'cookies' send by US 
companies to pc's owned by data subjects).    FIDIS 
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which were taken in a cumulative way into account when the consent was prepared and 
drafted. The possibility that biometric data include information about health was also taken 
into account. The consent also included reference to the user questionnaires. A draft proposed 
consent was discussed amongst all involved parties, agreed and finalized for use in the test. 
The consent was also preceded with extensive information about the processing aspects of the 
demonstrator. This information and consent is set forth in the Annex. 
Notification obligation - The processing of personal data shall in principle be notified in the 
countries where the local data protection laws apply (see above) and require such notification. 
For the test purposes, exemptions could apply. 
Switzerland: The processing of biometric data was in principle subject to notification.
7 
However, there is an exemption if there is an independent data protection official appointed 
(see art. 11 a 5 e) or a certification (see art. 11 a 5 f in combination with art. 11).  
Belgium : The demonstrator had to be notified to the Belgian DPA. There were no exemptions 
which applied. The existing exemptions for access control or membership seemed not to 
apply (biometric data is not mentioned). The notification was done electronically before the 
start of the processing and confirmation of the notification from the Data Protection Authority 
was received.   
Germany: There was an exemption of notification if a data protection official was appointed 
which had been the case for all German institutions that participated in the study.  
The Netherlands: There is a Dutch exemption of notification for research.
8  
Other: Other measures were taken to comply with the applicable local data protection 
legislation, including  
  appointment of a data protection official by AXSionics (in which case no notification 
is required under Swiss Data protection law (see art. 11 a 5.e) ); 
  all steps to fully inform and to ask the free consent of volunteers in conformity with all 
locally applicable laws (see information and consent form as mentioned above and as 
shown in the Annex) ; 
  two processor agreements with the processors of the data (the Clavid operator and the 
Fidis server site operator) were drafted and concluded ; 
  AXSionics collected and evaluated the data for strictly the purpose of the Fidis D3.14 
report and destroys the raw data afterwards (supervision by the data protection 
official). The raw data also include the report on OpenID access to the internal Fidis 
site with Clavid OpenIDs ; 
  minimisation of the data collection. As only data was collected that had been 
necessary for the test purpose; 
  In order for the research demonstrator to qualify under the Dutch exemption of 
notification of the research, all personal data collected under the demonstrator in all 
countries will be deleted at the latest 6 months after collection (see ‘Exemption 28 
                                                 
7 See art. 11a.3 of the Swiss data protection legislation :  ‘ wenn (…) regelmässig besonders schützenswerte 
Personendaten (..) bearbeitet werden’. 
8 See ‘Exemption 28 (Art. 30 Exemption Decree)’, available (in Dutch) at http://www.cbpweb.nl/HvB 
_website_1.0/vwc28.htm ). FIDIS 
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(Art. 30 Exemption Decree)’, available (in Dutch) at 
http://www.cbpweb.nl/HvB_website_1.0/vwc28.htm ).  
  The AXS Internet Passport remained in the hand of the data subjects after the test. The 
data subjects could at their choice continue their usage or not at their own discretion. 
They may also unregister or not their account at Clavid at their own discretion. 
3.3.4 Positioning  of  the demonstrator  
The demonstrator system provides a privacy enhancing solution for various (legal and 
privacy) concerns relating to a application that uses biometric data. These concerns relate, as 
mentioned, to risks of leakage of sensitive information, the use of biometric data for 
identification purposes without knowledge of the data subject, the use as unique identifier and 
use for purposes other than those originally intended. All these risks are considerable in 
centrally controlled biometric data applications. In general, biometric systems as 
authentication means are moreover far more complex than for example the use of a password 
or PIN check.
9 A biometric system always requires that (i) biometric characteristics are 
previously to the authentication, captured from the data subject, processed and stored for 
comparison and that (ii) the same characteristics are for comparison captured from the data 
subject and processed again. In a centralised biometric application infrastructure, the data 
subject looses control over his or her biometric data, stored in various places and processed by 
the various components of the system of which the data subject is not or almost not informed.  
The control by the data subject over biometrics that are stored on a token, however, would 
mean that the data subject would control the biometric data and the usage of the biometric 
device.
10 The data subject would in principle know (and control) when the biometric 
information is used (e.g., for comparison), and also by whom. Subject to the further technical 
specifications, the data would also not leave the card. Ownership of the token, would in 
principle not be of primary importance, but may enhance the control of the data subject over 
his or her biometric information.
11  
This control by the data subject is not specifically mentioned in the Directive 95/46/EC. 
However, the Directive aims at transparency for the data subject and user controlled biometric 
authentication means certainly increases such transparency. Moreover, the Directive clearly 
requires purpose limitation and data minimisation which are advanced by a user-controlled 
biometric system. The biometric data locally stored, upon the condition that it does not leave 
the card, will also not leak sensitive information (such as health related information), be used 
as unique identifier or for surveillance purposes. Errors, because of the local storage, are also 
reduced. The architecture of the demonstrator and the technical specifications therefore could 
be qualified as privacy enhancing; If the data subject has the choice to use the biometric 
                                                 
9 See also ‘Biometrics’ in The Future of Identity in the Information Society. Challenges and Opportunities, K. 
Rannenberg e.a. (eds.), Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, p. 147.[Future] 
10 Reference is also made to previous ideas to give the citizen more control over personal data, for example, in 
the Netherlands, where it was pleaded some time ago to give citizens the right to control a so-called ‘digital safe’ 
(digital kluisje)with their personal data. It would contain not only basic (identity) information such as name and 
address, but also other personal data, such as health or financial data. Such ‘digital safe’ would preferably be 
held in a webbased application. See GBA-commissie wil digital kluisje, 30 March 2001, available at 
http://www.computable.nl/artikel/nieuws/146476/250449/gbacommissie-wil-digitaal-kluisje.html  
11 For example, because the token is not to be returned and no biometric data will leave the possession of the 
data subject. FIDIS 
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enhanced digital identity assistant or not, the right of the data subject to object against the 
processing of biometric data are also respected. Because these technical measures limit 
considerably the risks of abuse of biometric data, the risks for the data subject become more 
limited. Because of the advantages that biometric data may offer in authentication 
applications which require increased security, the use of biometric data may be considered to 
fulfil the proportionality criterion for such purposes of verification. Whether the data subject 
is able to exercise his or her right to alternative means, will depend on the practical 
implementation. 
The demonstrator with a user-controlled biometric architecture is also in line with the user-
controlled and user-centric identity management concepts and systems mentioned by many to 
solve the increasingly complicated problems of loss of privacy, e.g. by data breaches. Such 
systems are being developed for the enhancements of the (data protection) rights of the 
users.
12 Although the demonstrator is based on the divided control model [Fidis310], whereby 
the identity or service provider will control the processing of the data, the data subject will 
retain full control over his or her biometric data which will not be shared or disclosed outside 
the card.
13 
The concept is also in line with the right to privacy. The fundamental right of respect for 
one’s privacy
14 includes the aspect that a person has rights (of control) over personal 
information. In a pioneering work of 1967
15, Alan F. Westin defined privacy as ‘the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about themselves is communicated to others.’ (stress added). Westin stressed 
privacy as a form of autonomy, in particular, the ability to control the flow of information 
about oneself. In his view, an individual should be able to decide between or to remain ‘in 
solitude, intimacy, anonymity, (…)’. Westin has further defined this aspect of privacy as 
follows : ‘Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’ 
(stress added).
16 Arthur R. Miller
17 also stated shortly thereafter that ‘the basic attribute of an 
effective right to privacy [is] the individual’s ability to control the flow of information 
concerning or describing him [..]’ (stress added) The personal information that one want to 
control will in the first place concern information which closely relates to the person and are 
regarded as intimate, and which a person would want to keep for him- or herself or at least to 
restrict the collection, use and circulation thereof. Examples include information about one’s 
                                                 
12  See, for example, other projects, such as Prime and Primelife, in particular the Prime white paper, v. 3, 15 
May 2008 available online: https://www.prime-project.eu/prime_products/whitepaper/index.html. 
13 This model is therefore also referred to as a user-controlled biometric authentication system, although – 
contrary to the model of e.g., Prime – the data subject will not have control over the other components of the 
identity management system, while retaining control over the biometric data. 
14 For example, as laid down in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.  
15 A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, New York, Atheneum, 1967. 
16 A. Westin, o.c., p. 7. 
17 Arthur R. Miller published in 1971 in the United States the book ‘The Assault on Privacy’, in which he 
examined the effect of the technological revolution (of that time) on individual privacy. He made various 
proposals to reconcile technology with society values, which aroused discussion and controversy. See A. Miller, 
The Assault on Privacy : Computers, Data Bases and Dossiers, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan press, 1971. FIDIS 
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health or sex life, but could also include biometric information because of its unique 
characteristics which are linked with an individual.  
Do user-centric solutions imply that the data subject would become controller of the 
processing ? The use of the term ‘control’ by the user is not to be confused with the concept 
of control by the data controller in the data protection legislation. This concept of control by 
the data controller refers to the control over the ‘means used’ and the ‘purposes of the 
processing’ of the personal data. The entities which decide over these aspects, are under the 
present data protection legislation considered responsible for the data processing and shall 
comply with all data protection legislation obligations. This does not change with user-
controlled or user-centric biometric systems. For example, if a banking company would want 
the users of online banking applications to be more securely authenticated, the bank will in 
most cases take the decision about the use of for example the (biometric) token for the 
purposes of the authentication of its clients. The bank will hence remain the controller of the 
processing.   
In other settings, even an ISP or telecom organisation could be the controller of the identity 
management system.
18  
Finally, technology alone will not be sufficient to enhance the data protection and privacy 
rights of the data subjects. Additional organizational and compliance measures remain 
necessary, such as the provision of sufficiently detailed and understandable information about 
the processing, the organisation of alternative means and choice thereof and the internal but 
independent control of the directive’s application or, where necessary, a notification to the 
data protection authorities.  
4  Demonstrator system and field test 
The demonstrator system consists of an OpenID established at the site of the OpenID identity 
provider Clavid and an AXS Internet Passport that is used for the identity verification 
whenever a user uses his OpenID Identifier. 
The field test was done with 30 test persons equally distributed in the participating countries 
Belgium, Germany, Holland and Switzerland and administered by a local country test agent 
who selects the field test participants
19. All the test persons were accepted as users on the 
internal Fidis web site. Each test person had to establish an OpenID Identifier and use this 
identifier for the login into the Fidis internal homepage. We expected that the test persons also 
use their OpenID Identifier for logins into further web sites that also accept OpenID. 
4.1  OpenID Identity Provider 
The OpenID Identifier suitable for the field test has to be established by a OpenID identity 
provider who has implemented the authentication protocol of the AXS Internet Passport in his 
OpenID identity verification check procedure. Such an OpenID identity provider is the Swiss 
company Clavid  [Clavid]. Clavid provides special secured OpenID identifiers that use a 
                                                 
18 The fact that AXSionics was in the field test controller of the processing does not change this fact. It is clear 
that AXSionics was only controller because of the demonstration purposes of the field test organized by 
AXSionics. 
19 There were 30 test persons, 4 test agents and the field test organizer that used the Clavid service during the 
field test period. FIDIS 
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strong authentication protocol for the identity verification of the user. Any relying party web 
site that offers authentication through OpenID then can take advantage of the strong 
authentication achieved with the AXS Internet Passport.  
4.2  Field test communication architecture 
The communication architecture for the field test authentication with the Internet Passport at 
all Relying Parties accepting OpenIDs is sketched in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 6: Dataflow for the authentication using OpenID combined with the AXS AS  
 
4.3  Field test setup 
The field test separated in the three phases 
  Preparation 
The preparation included: 
o  Define and establish the detailed concept and schedule to run the field test 
o  Recruit a suitable OpenID Provider and support him to make the necessary 
technical developments to allow the link of the OpenID with the AXS Internet 
Passport via the AXS Authentication System 
o  Find country agents among the Fidis collaborators for the administration of the 
field test in the participating countries of Fidis partners (Germany, Belgium, 
Holland Switzerland) 
o  Recruit 6 to 8 test users in all participating countries over the country agents 
o  Develop a questionnaire that reflects the open questions for which answers 
were needed to achieve the field test goals 
o  Investigate about legal constraints for the usage of biometric authentication 
means and take corresponding actions, e.g. naming of a data protection officer 
o  Develop the consent forms and documents for the users and operators that 
comply with the legal constraints in each country FIDIS 
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o  Develop a detailed user guidance (document, video clips) for the requested 
user actions during the AXS Internet Passport personalization and the 
registration at the Clavid Identity Provider 
  Execution 
The execution included: 
o  Anonymous distribution of the AXS Internet Passports, the legal forms, the 
instructions and the questionnaires to the test users via the country agents 
o  Support, consulting and controlling of the test users by the country agents to 
follow the test protocol 
o  The execution of the below presented test protocol by the test users during the 
runtime of the field test 
o  The collection of the questionnaires 
  Evaluation 
The evaluation included: 
o  Collection of all user feedbacks during the field test run 
o  Retrieval and statistical evaluation of the questionnaires 
o  Report 
The field test run was initially scheduled for fall 2008 with a runtime of 3 months. Due to 
some technical problems related with the linkage of the Internet Passport with the OpenID 
Identifier the schedule had to be shifted to the first 4 months of the year 09. The collection of 
the field test questionnaires was completed by mid June 09. 
4.3.1  Test protocol and User actions in the field test 
In the field test setup the test user had to follow a certain test protocol  
  Receive the test material from a local test agent 
The test material consist of the packed AXS Internet Passport, a test user consent 
form, a customised user instruction for the field test and a questionnaire  
  Fill out and return the test user consent form 
The consent form makes the user aware of the potential threats that could emerge from 
the use of a biometric system and is a waiver for the field test organisers 
  Establish an OpenID account  
The user registers at Clavid to receive an OpenID identifier and gets his personal 
protected OpenID identity account 
  Personalize the AXS Internet Passport 
The Web Site of Clavid supports the user in the fingerprint enrolment process when 
the user personalizes his AXS Internet Passport  
  Link the AXS Internet Passport with the OpenID identifier 
The user defines in his protected OpenID account that she wants to use her AXS 
Internet Passport whenever she uses the OpenID issued by Clavid at any accepting site 
  Use his AXS Internet Passport for all OpenID authentications 
The OpenID authentication consist then of the standard challenge response protocol 
for authentication that runs with  the AXS Internet Passport. The user authenticated 
himself with the OpenID – AXS Internet Passport combination as often as possible at 
the Fidis web site and at any other web site that accepts the OpenID identifier 
  Report experience 
The user had to complete the field test questionnaire and send it back, optional he or FIDIS 
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she communicated further personal experience or comments directly or through the 
test agent to the field test organizer. 
The test user can keep the personalized AXS Internet Passport with the recorded biometric 
fingerprint data. The security concept of the AXS Internet Passport does not allow the 
deletion of biometric data which are enclosed inside the passport. Any manipulation on the 
biometric data, including the deletion or alteration by the user, could create a threat for the 
identity of the user.   
4.3.2  Raw data - usage statistics 
All the 30 test users personalized their Internet Passports at the Clavid AXS initialisation 
service. Fig. 7 and 8 show the usage statistics of the AXS Internet Passports during the field 
test period 1.1.09 – 31.5.09.  
 
 
Figure 7: The usage statistics over the test period (not all test persons started test usage 
at the same time; each individual test period lasted 3 month; some of the users continued 
to use the AXS Internet Passport after the test) 
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Figure 8: Individual usage statistics. The average usage per month was 6.6 authentica-
tions per person , but with large individual fluctuations and a diminution over time  
Some of the test users started the field test later and some stopped it after the completion of 
the test protocol (which originally was configured for a 3 month test). Taking the effective 
test period into account the average usage over the full test period was 6.6 
authentications/month. But there were quite large fluctuations, some test persons did not use 
their AXS Internet Passport anymore after the first month, some others continued to use it at a 
relative high frequency. 
It stands out that many test persons used  the AXS authentication with the OpenID mainly in 
the beginning of the test period. This is understandable as the test persons were interested by 
the novelty of the biometric recognition and the possibility of the OpenID identity 
management. Once this novelty effect had passed the number of authentications dropped to a 
level which actually is probably typical for the usage of the OpenID access to acceptor sites. 
After the first two months we observed approx. 2 authentications per person/per month. Part 
of this usage drop may also be explained by the fact that the test setup explicitly requested the 
usage of the OpenID Identifier for the access to the Fidis internal web site. No other 
suggestion was made and most of the test persons will not access the Fidis internal website at 
a very high frequency.   
4.3.3  Raw data – questionnaires and user comments 
During the field test the users completed a questionnaire that was developed to clarify the user 
attitude towards biometrics and privacy and to collect the feedback on usability and 
ergonomics of the AXS Internet Passport. The questionnaire included the following sections: 
  Test participant profile 
with general information about age, gender, technology affinity and usage 
environment 
  Attitude towards biometrics and privacy protection 
with questions that reveal the basic attitude of the user to the usage of biometrics and 
the protection of privacy 
  First impressions 
with questions to be filled out right after the reception of the AXS Internet Passport 
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  Getting started 
with questions about the initial user experience and the personalization process  
  Using the card 
with questions about the ergonomics and the understanding of the usage procedures 
especially of the biometrics in the daily applications 
  Documentation 
with questions about the user behaviour relative to written or shown usage guidance 
The detailed list of questions in the questionnaire is presented in the annex. The return rate of 
the questionnaires was 69 %, with responses from participants of all countries FIDIS 
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5  Evaluation of field test results 
The 22 participants of the field test that returned the questionnaire represented a good mix of 
persons 
  All countries of the field test participants were represented 
  More than a third of the responding persons were females 
  The age mixture showed a ratio between younger (below 40 - 72 %) and older (above 
40 – 28 %) persons that is close to a typical value for Internet users
20 
  About half of the sample persons indicated that they have an IT background.
21   
  A third had already some usage experience with fingerprint biometrics 
Although the small sample does not allow a profound quantitative analysis of the user 
behaviour and acceptance, some significant qualitative patterns can be clearly identified. 
5.1  Attitude towards biometrics and privacy in the Internet 
Privacy and identity theft were indicated as the main worries on the Internet.
22 Almost all 
participants, except one, indicated that privacy was of high or at least relevant importance in 
identity management systems. Identity theft and profiling were mentioned as the major 
privacy risks. It is noteworthy that security (in the sense of data protection) was not perceived 
as a major privacy risk of identity management systems (rather identity theft and profiling). 
As to biometrics, there was equally a mix of persons who had some previous experience with 
biometrics (8 persons) while others did not (13 persons). A large majority, with the exception 
of 3 persons, considered data protection important for biometrics. At the same time, the 
awareness of data protection legislation ranged from high (6 participants) to low (9 
participants) while the remaining persons could not give an opinion on that or had no 
awareness at all. Profiling and identity abuse were mentioned as one of the main privacy risks 
of biometrics. 
As to the expectations on biometrics, 13 participants referred to security, while 16 participants 
mentioned convenience (several aspects could be named). Only 2 persons had no expectations 
at all and 5 persons mentioned different aspects.    
The fact that convenience from biometrics is higher rated than security or privacy was 
surprising for the field test organizers but it is in accordance with the experience made with 
first deployments of the AXS-AS in commercial environments. For some test users 
convenience is even attractive to trade against privacy. While 11 participants stated that they 
would not give up privacy for convenience, 8 indicated that they might sometimes and 3 
agreed therewith.  
Biometrics only is considered for about a third of the test sample (6) a valuable option for 
authentication in any situation; another third (7) does not consider biometrics as a valuable 
authentication method. The remaining persons make it dependent from the application. 
                                                 
20 Combining the percentage of users for a certain age group with the age pyramid shows that in western 
countries typically 30 % of the Internet users are over 40 years old (see http://tips.vlaurie.co/2009/02/02/age-
distribution-of-american-online-users and http://www.nationmaster.com/country/us/Age_distribution) 
21 12 indicated that they had an IT background while 7 stated no on this point and 3 were unknown. 
22 11 indicated privacy as worries, while 9 mentioned ID theft. FIDIS 
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5.2  Findings about usability, convenience and ergonomics 
The questions related to the user experience were grouped (see 4.3.3) in four sections 
covering the lifecycle of the AXS Internet Passport in the hand of the users during the field 
test plus questions about the finger usage preference. 
Delivery and first contact 
The feedback on the delivery and the first contact with the biometric card was largely 
positive; only one person had a negative impression. But beside some minor issues 
concerning the packaging there was a substantial group (6) which did not understand the 
purpose of the PIMA token. It is also striking that half of the test persons did not consult the 
user guide upon reception of the card.  
Personalisation and registration at the OpenID provider 
The personalization act included the enrolment of 3 fingers and the entry of a 6 digit PIN 
code. For each fingerprint the user had to enter 3 good quality reference templates sweeping 
over the fingerprint sensor. For the PIN capture the user had to enter twice the same number 
using the fingerprint sensor to navigate over of virtual keypad which is shown on the 
graphical display of the card. Both action request a certain ability to use the fingerprint sensor 
in the correct way (slight pressure, continuous movements). It turned out that this basic motor 
skill was one of the biggest ergonomic hurdle. The difficulty was emphasised by the fact that 
the first time the sensors were used the device requested already a high quality fingerprint 
capture. Although the problem was expected and training material has been provided in form 
of pictures, videos and explanations two thirds of the users had problems to enter the 
reference templates of the fingerprints and still over half of the test persons did not understand 
how to do so or had difficulties to enter the PIN codes
23. Although many users had problems 
to complete the personalization in a first trial, all test persons finally succeeded to personalize 
the card but some of them needed multiple trials. One of these users returned the following 
comment: 
“It takes a lot of time and effort to get the device to accept you as the 
user (i.e. the personalization process). Swiping fingers sounds easy but 
turned out to be quite a challenge. Funny enough, after personalizing the 
device I experienced no problems when swiping fingers to get access to the 
Fidis website. This really strikes me as odd. How can I have so much 
trouble entering my fingerprints and so little applying them? Now that this 
initial hurdle has been taken, it turns out to be an easy to use device.” 
The problem of the initial personalization of a personal device with biometrics is imminent as 
long as the personalization process occurs remotely in the field. Practical and economical 
constraints urge organisations that will deploy such devices to find solutions for a more 
convenient remote personalization. Technically it is possible to improve the reference 
template capture in a way that no higher quality of the captured data is requested for the first 
reference template registration which reduces the problem to some extent. Further technical 
and organisational measures to reduce the initial difficulties of the user are recommended. 
                                                 
23 15 users declared to have problems with the fingerprint reference template enrollment; 14 users had problems 
or did not understand immediately how to enter the PIN; only 8 users declared to personalize the PIMA without 
problems. FIDIS 
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Once the personalisation has been completed the user had to link his AXS Internet Passport 
with the previously created OpenID identifier. This link was performed online on the OpenID 
account management site at Clavid. Also this step was not performed without difficulties
24. 
The main problem was the long reading time over the optical interface necessary to complete 
the secure channel allocation to the OpenID provider within the AXS Internet Passport. 
Usage experience 
In general the usage of the card for the authentication of the delivered OpenID Identifier did 
not cause any basic problems. Most of the test persons understood the logic and processing 
protocol for the secure authentication process (Fig.6). There were however several critical 
statements concerning the higher process complexity for the user compared with a simple 1-
factor authentication like Username/PW. Two statements from test user illustrate this 
retention: 
“However, when comparing the time it takes me to log into a website using 
the passport and using a traditional username and password combination, the 
latter is far quicker.” 
“The login and authentication procedure is - unfortunately - still quite 
complex, especially when compared to its biggest competitor: username and 
password, thus probably limiting the actual adaption of the card as part of 
day-to-day authentication.“ 
Part of this reluctance to adopt a strong authentication using the AXS Internet Passport comes 
from the use of the optical interface which in some cases had too long transmission times for 
the authentication message. The problem was greatly reduced for some replacement cards 
with improved optical interface compared to the first supplied cards. But there are principal 
objections against any additional processing for the authentication: 
“My overall impression of the AXSionics authentication system is an unique 
roundabout way off getting access in a complex way to websites with a 
simple OpenID.  
People request enhanced privacy and security but they are not willing to accept additional 
operational complexity for the day-to-day life. It is clear that this lack of acceptance is partly 
due to the fact that all sites which accept OpenID (inclusive the Fidis internal web site) do not 
protect a high financial value neither for the operator nor the user. The use of multifactor 
authentication should therefore be restricted to the access control to high value sites.  
The AXS Internet Passport in principle allows choosing a staggered authentication level with 
1-factor (card present only), 2-factor (card and biometrics) and 3-factor (card, biometrics and 
PIN). This adjustment feature was not used in the field test to force the test users as often as 
possible into a biometric authentication with a 2- or 3-factor protocol. In a productive 
environment the security level for the authentication should be adapted to the security needs 
of the accessed site. In most cases of access control to typical Internet sites (accessible by 
OpenID) a 1-factor authentication is largely sufficient. The card just returns the access code 
read over the optical interface without a biometric recognition of the actual user. The use of 
an additional hardware based token for the authentication process however will always reduce 
the convenience of a username/PW only authentication, at least as long as the UserID/PW is 
readily available for the user. As soon as a higher protection is also in the interest of the user 
                                                 
24 9 persons claimed that they did not succeed with the registration at the first time. FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.14 
 
lFinal , Version: 1.0 
File: fidis_deliverable_wp3_14_V1_0_final 
Page 34 
 
(e.g. protection of online e-banking transactions) the acceptance of additional steps in the 
authentication process will probably be higher.  
Documentation 
A quite well known fact came also out of the field test. People don’t like to read manuals or 
instruction guides independent of how much didactical effort is put in their design. Most of 
the test persons declared that the User Guide and the additional test user instruction was 
helpful (16 useful; 3 not useful), but most of them only read it after they stocked somewhere 
in the initialisation process. Many users mentioned that the online instruction immediately 
present and accessible online on the site, where a specific action was requested, was helpful. 
In general the biggest usage problems with the AXS Internet Passport were related with the 
sweeping of the fingerprint over the sensor and the correct positioning of the card on the 
screen to read the flicker code. Both actions are difficult to explain but are very easily 
understood when an animation shows how to do it. For such kind of problems classical forms 
of documentation can not be helpful. Animated online clips would better fit the needs of the 
user. 
Fingerprint preferences 
The used fingers enrolled by the test persons (see annex) shows a very biased distribution 
towards the index and middle finger and reflects the typical preference for the right hand in 
the population. This result suggest that the choice of the finger for the authentication does not 
have a high entropy. It therefore makes little sense to include such a choice in a security 
concept, e.g. by adding a fingercode. Originally the AXS Internet Passport allowed such a 
fingercode and it was still present in the field test personalization scheme. It however was not 
used in the authentication for the just mentioned reason. 
5.3  Privacy aspects encountered within the field test 
An important aspect of the field test arrangement is as to whether the participants were 
convinced that they had more control over the biometric data that they provided. 13 of the 
participants were convinced on that point, while 9 were not. This fact shows that it is difficult 
to persuade persons through technical measures of a certain fact. Even the fact that it is 
physically impossible that the token discloses the fingerprint data to an outside instance was 
not sufficient to convince all persons that their biometric data are well protected.    
Some also commented that (more detailed) information about the processing of the biometric 
data would preferably also be given (and repeated) during the (enrolment and ) verification 
process. One aspect of a PIMA was not exploited explicitly in the field test. It concerns the 
possibility to use different pseudonyms that all retrieve to the same person. This potential to 
protect an individual from profiling attacks intrinsic by the user-side identity management 
approach was pointed out by one of the test persons: 
“Only after logging into the clavid -site I found that I could create 
several personas. This is what would be helpful for someone who would like 
to manage his online presence, but it was never explained in any of the 
instructions that this could be done, or what the benefit of his would be. 
In other words: one of the biggest selling points of the AXS-AS solution is 
never pointed out to the inexperienced user.” 
In principle the concept of the AXS Internet Passport also allows completly anonymous 
authentication. This usage option was not available to the test persons but in view of the 
above user comment should be made available in future editions. FIDIS 
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5.4  Recommendations based on the findings of the field test  
The running experience and the result of the evaluation of the different feedbacks allow to 
convey the following recommendations for a PIMA based authentication system with 
encapsulated biometric and with the divided control scheme: 
  The usability and ergonomics of the personalization and authentication process is 
preponderant over all other aspects 
  The lack of usage experience and the request for high quality reference templates rise 
a critical initial threshold for the personalization process, which can lead to a high user 
frustration. An initialization scheme with distributed MIMA in the field has to take 
this danger into account. The initial usage threshold should be reduced as far as 
possible. 
  Although people rate privacy and security very high they are unwilling to accept any 
additional inconvenience compared to the simplest authentication methods. Biometric 
authentication should therefore only be used in specific situation where the user has a 
high consciousness of the potential security threats. The applied authentication process 
in a PIMA should be customisable to the specific application. 
  Biometrics is well accepted as soon as the initial usage difficulties are mastered. 
Biometrics even can add to the ergonomics as one has not to memorize cumbersome 
passcodes. There remains however a reluctance concerning biometric data. Irrational 
fears about the loss of biometric data are forwarded even by persons with a high level 
of technical understanding. A transparent and reliable communication about the usage 
of biometric data should be provided by the editor of a PIMA device. 
  Classical approaches for the user information like user guides or manuals deliver not 
the necessary information for the operation of a biometric system. The user has to 
learn a specific motion sequence and adopt the right motor skills to deliver a biometric 
template capture. This is best learned in an interactive way with the biometric system 
itself with corrective user feedback in combination with animations that show how the 
right movements look like. 
  The usage of pseudonyms in the Internet that all are securely linked to the same 
person could provide a higher level of privacy and protection against identity fraud. In 
such a scheme that is supported by a PIMA the user has not to reveal any other 
information than the fact that behind a certain pseudonym stands always the same real 
person. This setting would come close to the real world situation where people are 
accustomed (e.g. in a warehouse) to interact with other persons without revealing their 
identity. The possibility to link identity secured pseudonyms to a personal card like the 
AXS Internet Passport should be exploited and made available to all users. 
  During the full field test no false acceptance has been communicated. It seems likely 
that the biometric performance in a personal biometric system has to be tuned for a 
minimal false rejection rate. The probability of a false acceptance is greatly reduced 
by the typical operational setting of a PIMA where only one person has access to the 
biometric device. The FAR has just to be small enough that a finder of a lost or stolen 
token is refused at a sufficiently high probability. 
The overall results of the field test are helpful for the design and optimisation of biometric 
PIMA. Some of the findings have already been implemented in replacement tokens during the 
second part of the field test and showed the improvement potential. 
 FIDIS 
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6 Conclusions 
The deliverable D3.14 allowed to test and to verify the previously elaborated [Fidis310] and 
propagated concept of divided control over an encapsulated biometric authentication system. 
The concept was realised in a PIMA, the AXS Internet Passport, with a user centric on-board 
identity management [Prime]. The concrete application was the securing of a self defined 
OpenID Identifier with the strong authentication of the AXS Internet Passport. For this the 
OpenID identifier for each test user had to be defined at the Swiss OpenID provider Clavid 
that installed the option to link the AXS Internet Passport with the OpenID identifier 
established through his service. The technical realisation of this link, the preparation of the 
user interface, the definition of the ergonomic workflow and the preparation of the user 
instruction material lasted longer than originally foreseen. Also the production and the 
operational preparation of the test cards took more time than originally scheduled. Therefore 
the field test had to be rescheduled from fall 2008 to spring 2009.  
The field test involved 30 test persons and 5 supporting agents each using the PIMA at least 
during a 3 months period to the begin of the year 2009. The test user were urged to use the 
OpenID identifier secured by the AXS Internet Passport for all sites that accept OpenID 
authentication even if such sites often do not protect content with a high financial value 
(typical sites are the Fidis internal homepage, social network sites, online info systems with 
registration etc). The intent was to gain as much as possible practical experience with the 
frequent usage of biometrics for authentication purposes.  
The preparation of the field test also included a rigorous assessment of the legal situation for 
systems and organisations that process biometric data. This work resulted in a set of 
accompanying legal documents for the organisers, the processing institutions and the involved 
test persons. The legal situation is quite heterogeneous within the European Community and 
therefore the field test was restricted to test users in four countries where the legal situation 
was manageable with limited costs (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland). 
With an anonymous questionnaire addressing the attitude of the test users towards privacy, 
biometrics and their ergonomic experience with the test setup the users gave their feedback to 
the field test organizers. The evaluation of the 22 returned questionnaires and of the 
spontaneous feedback from the users showed that greatest care has to be applied to the 
usability and the ergonomics of a biometric system that is distributed in the field. In theory 
people rate privacy and security high, but in the daily practice ergonomic and convenience 
aspects prevail. This contradiction between behaviour and claim can also be observed on a 
much wider scale in the privacy neglecting usage of social network sites by most persons. A 
deployment of secure biometric authentication systems has to take this attitude into account 
and therefore the use of biometric in the authentication process should be sparse and restricted 
only to situations where a high security consciousness is already available by the application 
circumstances (eg. financial transactions, health information etc).  
In the ideal case the applied authentication protocols is dynamically adaptable to the concrete 
value protection situation. For the access to a social network site a 1-factor authentication is 
sufficient, but for the access to the private bank account the user will accept a 2- or 3-factor 
authentication with biometrics. This means that the PIMA needs a sufficient flexibility and 
intrinsic intelligence to adapt to this customisation need for the different sites that are 
accessed within a user centric federation scheme. The AXS Internet Passport allows the FIDIS 
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definition of the authentication level for each individual authentication process. This feature 
should be used to meet the expectations on convenience of the user.  
The question of the economics of a biometric system integrated in a PIMA according the 
divided control model could not be addressed within the settings of the field test. Market 
evaluations in other contexts done by AXSionics however show that the market is very 
sensitive on the price of security solutions. Biometric authentication is only accepted if it has 
only a marginal impact on the total cost of ownership for an organization that deploys such a 
system. Exceptions are organizations that operate in domains with extremely high security 
request mainly in the field of national defense. 
With these findings the original goals of the field test have been achieved
25. The 
recommendations for the use of biometrics made in previous deliverables based on principal 
considerations about privacy protection, security and legal constraints have to be completed 
with a recommendation that usability and convenience are at least equally important in 
practice. The divided control model and the encapsulation of biometrics within a PIMA 
remains still the preferred implementation for non forensic biometric authentication 
applications. An individual device that is often used by the same user in different situations is 
better adapted to the convenience needs than a centralised biometric authentication scheme 
with very limited possibilities for an individualised customisation. The usage learning process 
seems to be very important for the acceptance by the user and such a learning can best be 
achieved on a personal frequently used system.  
 
                                                 
25 The economic aspect was not directly covered by the field test FIDIS 
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Annex 1: Returned questionnaires 
The following questionnaire was the main feedback vector for the test persons to 
communicate their experience and opinion to the field test organizers: 
Questionnaire for the field test of Fidis Deliverable 3.14 
The questionnaire was elaborated by the participating Fidis partners in view of their interest 
about the collected feedback from the users. The full questionnaire is printed below: 
********************************************************************* 
Questionnaire for the field test of Fidis Deliverable 3.14 
Your honest and constructive answers provide the editors of the D3.14 report with real end user 
feedback for a system that has been described in the Fidis report D3.10 as a model for best practice 
applying biometrics for authentication purposes.  
It will also help the Fidis partner AXSionics to improve the quality of its products and services.   
Your answers will be treated strictly confidential. The participation in the field test is compliant 
with the data protection laws of the concerned countries. 
The questionnaire should be completed in the first half of the field test period and sent back to 
the test agent (the one which gave you the AXSionics Internet Passport and the questionnaire) 
before 
End of February 2009 
In the second half of the field test period you will get a second AXSionics Internet Passport with 
a modified user interface for testing
26. 
Thank you for participating in this project. 
 
The editors 
Lorenz Müller (AXSionics AG), Els Kindt (KU Leuven) 
 
                                                 
26 This second passport will be delivered to a selected sample of test persons in Sept 2009. The results of this 
continuation can not be covered in this report. FIDIS 
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0.  User and system information 
Please note:  
  Complete the following section before you start unpacking and using your AXSionics Internet Passport.  
  Please write legibly and use print letters. Thank you.  
Test participant information  
Please tell us a little about yourself 
Country:     Sex:  o Female               o Male 
Age:  o less than 40    o over 40  Internet:  o frequent user      o rare user 
Profession:  o with technical or IT background           o with no technical background 
System information  
Please tell us about the computer system you use 
System:  o Laptop    o Desktop  Monitor type:  o LCD    o CRT    o Plasma 
Monitor 
dimension: 
Diagonal in inches or cm. Example: 19“  Monitor 
resolution:  
In pixels. Example: 1024 x 768 
Web browser:  o Firefox    o Internet Explorer    o Opera    o Safari    o Other (name it):  
Have you used fingerprint sensors before?  o No    o Yes  
If Yes, what type of sensor and where?   o Touch     o Swipe    Where (name it):  
 
 
1.  General questions about attitude to identity, privacy protection and biometrics 
My opinion  
Your attitude, your expectations and your concerns are valuable inputs to evaluate the field test results 
1.1 What do you expect from 
using biometrics? 
 
Expected type of answer 
1.2 What are your main worries 
about making yourself known on 
the internet?  
  
Privacy  
Your attitude, your expectations and your concerns are valuable inputs to evaluate the field test results 
1.3 How important is the 
protection of your privacy in 
identity management systems?  
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
1.4 What is in your opinion the 
major privacy risk of identity 
management systems?  
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
1.5 Is giving up privacy an option 
for more convenience?  
Expected type of answer 
1.6 Are you aware of the details  Expected type of answer FIDIS 
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of data protection legislation? 
Biometrics  
Your attitude, your expectations and your concerns are valuable inputs to evaluate the field test results 
1.7 Have you used biometric 
applications before? 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
1.8 What do you think are the 
main privacy risks of biometrics?  
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
1.9 How do you valuate the 
importance of the protection of 
your biometric data?  
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
1.10 Would you be prepared to 
use your biometric without an 
additional factor such as  
a pin code?. 
 
 
2.  First impression 
Please complete this section as soon as possible after you unpacked your AXS Internet Passport (also 
referenced as the card).  
Receiving the AXSionics Internet Passport  
Please tell us about your first impression of the card  
2.1 What was your first 
impression of the card when you 
received the box? 
Please use 3-6 descriptive key words 
2.2 Was it easy to open the box? 
 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
2.3 Was it easy to get the content 
out of the box? Did something fall 
out unexpectedly? 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
2.4 Did you easily find all the 
content of the box? Did you miss 
anything in particular? 
 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
2.5 Did the card fulfill your 
expectations? What could be 
improved, and how? 
 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
Getting started and proceeding 
Please tell us how clear the next steps to take were after opening and unpacking the box 
2.6 Was it clear what to do next 
after unpacking the content?  
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
2.7 Was the quick guide helpful 
in explaining the next steps? 
Comment freely. Also, report any problems you may have experienced. 
2.8 Was the purpose of  
the card clear?  
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. Where would you look for this information? FIDIS 
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2.9 Did you easily find the 
address of the web page that you 
needed to call to get started? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
2.10 Did you read or consult the 
quick guide before you powered 
ON the card? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
2.11 Did you read or consult the 
quick guide after you powered 
ON the card? 
Comment freely. If YES, please explain why. 
 
3.  Initialisation 
Please complete this section as soon as possible after the personalization and registration step.  
Personalization (making the connection between you and the card) 
Please tell us about your experience during the personalization process 
3.1 Was the purpose of the 
personalization process clear? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.2 Did you easily find the serial 
number of your card? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.3 Was it clear how to enter the 
serial number into the web page 
form? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.4 Was the purpose or the 
concept of the finger code well 
described? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. Where would you look for this information? 
This question was not evaluated, because the concept was not applied 
3.5 Were you able to enter the 
finger code into the web form 
without any problems? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
This question was not evaluated, because the concept was not applied 
3.6 Was the purpose of the 
flickering clear? 
 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.7 Was it clear how to scan in 
the flickering from the computer 
monitor? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.8 Was the purpose or the 
concept of the PIN code well 
described? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. Where would you look for this information? 
3.9 Were you able to enter the 
PIN code on the card without any 
problems? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.10 Was the purpose of the 
response code displayed on the 
card clear? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. Where would you look for this information? 
This question was not evaluated, everybody understood the concept 
3.11 Was the response code 
displayed on the card easy to 
read? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
This question was not evaluated FIDIS 
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3.12 Were you able to complete 
the personalization process 
without any problems? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
3.13 Did the card accept your 
fingerprints easily during the 
enrollment? 
Comment freely. If NO, please mention the amount of trials until the successful entry of the 
reference templates.. 
3.14 Are you convinced that your 
biometric data remains under 
your full control? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
Registration (making a connection between the card and the online service) 
Please tell us about your experience during the registration process 
3.15 Was the purpose of the 
registration process clear? 
 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not.  
3.16 Did you understand the 
concept of the finger code? 
 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not.  
This question was not evaluated, because the concept was not applied 
3.17 Were you able to complete 
the registration process without 
any problems? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
 
 
4.  Using the card 
Please complete this section some days after you started using your AXS-Card (typically after 10 
authentications with the card).  
Authentication (you using the card with an online service, e.g. Fidis internal)   
Please tell us about your experience during the authentication process 
4.1 Was the purpose of the 
authentication process clear? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.2 Were you able to complete 
the authentication process 
without any problems? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
Optical interface (scanning in a flickering from the computer monitor) 
Please tell us about your experiences when scanning in a flickering 
4.3 Was the flickering acceptable 
to your eye? 
 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.4 Was it clear how to position 
the card on the monitor to 
successfully scan the flickering? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.5 What is your perception of 
the time it took to scan in one 
flickering? 
 
Comment freely. FIDIS 
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4.6 Was the content of the quick 
guide helpful in explaining how 
to scan in a flickering? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.7 Was the information on the 
web pages helpful in explaining 
how to scan in a flickering? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.8 In general, what did you have 
most difficulties with when 
scanning in a flickering? 
Comment freely. 
Fingerprint sensor (sweeping a finger) 
Please tell us about your experiences you had when swiping a finger 
4.9 Was the fingerprint sensor 
pleasant to use? Did it feel 
“natural” to use it? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.10 Was it clear where to 
position the card in order to best 
swipe a finger? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.11 Was the content of the 
quick guide helpful in explaining 
how to swipe a finger? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.12 Was the information on the 
web pages helpful in explaining 
how to swipe a finger? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.13 Did you activate the 
fingerprint viewer application on 
the card to train swiping a finger? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.14 In general, what did you 
have most difficulties with when 
swiping a finger? 
Comment freely.  
Fingerprint sensor (entering a PIN code) 
Please tell us about your experiences you had when entering a PIN code 
4.15 Was the content of the 
quick guide helpful in explaining 
how to enter a PIN code? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.16 Was the information on the 
web pages helpful in explaining 
how to enter a PIN code? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.17 Did you activate the Pong 
game on the card to train 
navigating with the fingerprint 
sensor? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
4.18 In general, what did you 
have most difficulties with when 
entering a PIN code? 
Comment freely.  
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5.  Documentation  
Please complete this section as soon as possible after you started using your AXS-Card.  
Quick  guide  
Please tell us your opinion about the quick guide 
5.1 Did you carefully read the 
entire quick guide? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.2 Was the content of the quick 
clear and concise? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.3 Did the quick guide explain 
well how to scan in a flickering or 
how to enter a finger print 
correctly? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.4 Was the content of the quick 
guide helpful in solving any 
problems you may have had? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.5 What could be improved in 
terms of presentation, layout, 
content organization, etc.? 
Comment freely. 
Web pages  (information guiding you through the different steps) 
Please tell us your opinion about the information on the web pages guiding you through the process of activating the card 
5.6 Did you carefully read the 
instructions on the web pages? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.7 Was the content of the web 
pages clear and concise? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.8 Did the web pages explain 
well how to scan in a flickering or 
how to enter a finger print? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.9 Was the content of the web 
pages helpful completing the 
tasks? 
Comment freely. If NO, please explain why not. 
5.10 What could be improved in 
terms of presentation, layout, 
content organization, etc.? 
Comment freely. 
User behavior  (for our statistics) 
Please tell us about your [unconscious] preferences 
5.11 What is the hand you preferably use?  o Left    o Right 
5.12 Please indicate the fingers you used to 
personalize your card and the order you entered 
them by writing a number (1 for the first finger, 2 for 
the second, etc.) in the box above the corresponding 
finger.  
 
Do not mention your personal finger code.  
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Compiled answers from 22 test users 
In total 34 test users (DE 7, BE 6, NL 5, CH 2, unknown 2) participated in the field test and 22 of them returned the questionnaire. The results of the 
questionnaires have been compiled and are presented in the following table. For the evaluation occasionally several answer fields with related 
context questions have been combined. The numbers in the evaluation table rely to these questions in the above listed questionnaire. 
 
Questionnaire Evaluation 
Results              
  
0. Personal questions 
   CH  DE  BE  NL 
Country  4  7  6  5 
   F  M 
Sex  8  14 
   < 40  >40 
Age  16  6 
   Yes  No  Uknown 
IT Background  12  7  3 
   Yes  No  Uknown 
FP sensor experience  8  13  1 
  
1. General Questions 
   Security  Convenience  Other  None  Privacy  Reliability 
Expectation on biometrics (1.1)  13  16  5  2  1  1 
   Fraud  Privacy  ID theft  Other  Profiling  Abuse  None 
Worries on the Internet (1.2)  5  11  9  4  3  1  1 
   High  Medium  Low FIDIS 
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Importance of privacy in IMS (1.3)  19  2  1 
   Profileing  Identity theft  Others  Security  Revocability 
Major privacy risk of IMS (1.4)  12  11  4  1  1 
   Yes  No  Sometimes 
Privacy vs convienience (1.5)  3  11  8 
   High  Low  Unknown  No 
Awareness of data protection legislation 
(1.6) 
6  9  4  1 
   
   Yes  No 
Previous experience with biometrics 
(1.7) 
8  14 
        
   Dissemination  Abuse  Profiling  Other  Revocability  Theft  Fraud 
Main privacy risks of biometrics (1.8)  3  6  5  4  6  3  2 
   High  Low 
Importance of biometric data protection 
(1.9) 
19  3 
        
   Yes  No  Depends  Uknown 
Biometric only for authentication (1.10)  6  7  8  1 
  
2. First Impression 
   Positiv  Negativ  Unclear 
Reception of card, fullfil expectations 
(2.1; 2.5) 
18  1  3 
    
  
Easy  Difficult 
Easy but cable difficult to 
find 
Unclear 
  
Unpacking (2.2; 2.3; 2.4)  8  1  12  1 
   Clear  Not clear  Help from QG  Help from UI 
Next steps (2.6; 2.7; 2.9)  20  2  9  2 FIDIS 
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   Consulted  Not consulted  Consulted after power on 
Usefulness of Quick Guide (2.10; 2.11)  11  4  7 
   Clear  Not clear 
Purpose of card clear (2.8)  16  6 
  
3. Initialisation 
   Clear  Not clear 
Purpose of personalization process (3.1)  20  2 
   Clear  Not clear  Clear with issues 
Finding and entry of serial number (3.2; 
3.3) 
19  1  2 
    
   Clear  Not clear  Clear with issues 
Purpose and read flickering (3.6; 3.7)  9  7  6 
  
Clear  Not clear 
Entry 
problem        
Purpose and entry of PIN code (3.8; 3.9)  8  12  2 
   Yes  No 
Personalization without problems (3.12)  8  14 
   Easy  Difficult 
Fingerprint enrollment (3.13)  7  15 
   Convinced  Not convinced 
Control of biometric data (3.14)  13  9 
   Clear  Not clear 
Purpose  of registration (3.15)  18  4 
   Yes  No 
Success of registration (3.17)  13  9 
  
4. Using the card FIDIS 
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   Clear  Not clear 
Purpose of authentication (4.1)  21  1 
   Yes  No 
Sucess of authentication (4.2)  15  7 
   Yes  No 
Acceptance of flickering (4.3)  21  1 
   Clear  Not clear 
Optical interface ‐Scan the flickering 
(4.4; 4.6; 4.7; 4.8) 
18  4 
        
   Acceptable  Too long  Requires exercise 
Temporal ergonomics of flickering (4.5)  15  5  2  Responses range from extremely slow to very fast 
   Clear  Not clear 
Fingerprint reading (4.9; 4.10; 4.11; 4.12; 
4.13; 4.14) 
18  4 
        
   Clear  Not clear 
Entry of PIN code (4.15; 4.16; 4.17; 4.18)  21  1 
  
5. Documentation 
   Useful  Not useful  Not used 
Quick Guide (5.1; 5.2; 5.3; 5.4; 5.5)  16  3  3  QG does not really help for fingerprint entry problems 
   Useful  Not useful  Not used 
Web instruction (5.6; 5.7; 5.8; 5.9; 5.10)  16  2  4 
Fingerprint preference  Small finger  ring finger  middle finger  index  thumb 
Left  3  9  1 
Right  3  9  14  18  3 
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Annex 2: Usage statistic 
Raw data of test user statistics with anonymized user identifiers is presented in the table 
below. In total 35 users (30 test persons, 5 test agents) participated in the field test. The test 
persons are enumerated by letters A-Z,a-i. The listed usage statistics shows the usage of each 
test person over the time period from January to Mai (left 3 columns) and the usage of the 
different users over the test period (right 3 columns) grouped from month to month: 
 
Ordered according users 
Ordered  according 
month 
User  Month  responses  User Month responses
a  April  9  N  Jan 4
A  Mai  2  S  Jan 1
b  Jan  46  T  Jan 6
b  Feb  11  U  Jan 17
b  March  4  V  Jan 2
b  April  4  W  Jan 15
b  Mai  12  b  Jan 46
B  Feb  3  e  Jan 11
c  Mai  9  h  Jan 26
C  Feb  13  B  Feb 3
C  April  1  C  Feb 13
d  Feb  5  D  Feb 6
d  March  1  F  Feb 10
D  Feb  6  G  Feb 8
e  Jan  11  J  Feb 7
E  April  1  K  Feb 3
f  Feb  12  L  Feb 6
f  April  1  M  Feb 1
F  Feb  10  N  Feb 3
F  March  1  O  Feb 15
g  Feb  9  P  Feb 12
G  Feb  8  Q  Feb 3
G  March  1  R  Feb 11
h  Jan  26  U  Feb 2
h  Feb  10  W  Feb 2
h  March  3  b  Feb 11
h  April  3  d  Feb 5FIDIS 
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H  March  5  f  Feb 12
i  Mai  2  g  Feb 9
I  April  9  h  Feb 10
I  Mai  1  F  March 1
J  Feb  7  G  March 1
K  Feb  3  H  March 5
L  Feb  6  L  March 2
L  March  2  N  March 1
M  Feb  1  O  March 1
N  Jan  4  P  March 1
N  Feb  3  Q  March 6
N  March  1  W  March 1
O  Feb  15  X  March 5
O  March  1  Y  March 7
O  April  5  b  March 4
O  Mai  1  d  March 1
P  Feb  12  h  March 3
P  March  1  C  April 1
P  April  1  E  April 1
Q  Feb  3  I  April 9
Q  March  6  O  April 5
R  Feb  11  P  April 1
S  Jan  1  Z  April 3
T  Jan  6  a  April 9
U  Jan  17  b  April 4
U  Feb  2  f  April 1
V  Jan  2  h  April 3
W  Jan  15  A  Mai 2
W  Feb  2  I  Mai 1
W  March  1  O  Mai 1
W  Mai  18  W  Mai 18
X  March  5  b  Mai 12
Y  March  7  c  Mai 9
Z  April  3  i  Mai 2
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Annex 3: Legal framework documents 
To be compliant with general data protection rules of the countries concerned by the field test, 
two legal forms have been prepared.  
One is a Test User Consent form for the test users to be signed if they agree before the field 
test in which they obtain detailed information and provide their free, specific and informed 
consent with the fact that biometric data are processed during the field test. 
The second form is a Controller-Processor Agreement form. Individual agreements have been 
concluded between AXSionics, as the field test controller, and the organizations that process 
data of the field test on behalf of AXSionics for the purposes of the test. These organizations 
are the Fidis Web site operator and the OpenID identity provider, each of these two 
organizations signed such an agreement form. Through this form the organizations that 
contribute to the field test through data processing in any form declare their consent to 
process the data in accordance with the applicable data protection laws as a processor and 
only for purposes of the test. 
Test User Consent form 
The following form was signed by all test users: 
********************************************************************* 
Legal notice and consent form, including specific information, consent and agreement form for 
the field test of the AXS- card for deliverable D3.14 
(This legal notice is to be submitted to the individual researchers of the Fidis partners– participants in 
the AXS -card demonstrator, who are interested to participate in the AXS-card field test, and, upon 
agreement, is to be returned duly signed in writing, to AXSionics, Neumarkstrasse 27, 2503 Biel, 
Switzerland, before the start of the field test). 
 
Information about the use of the AXS-card for the Future of the Identity in the Information 
Society (FIDIS) field test and the processing of your personal data, including biometric data 
 
You, being a research member of one of the FIDIS institutions of the FIDIS project (see 
www.fidis.net), are hereby informed of the details of the field test for FIDIS Deliverable 3.14, 
involving a model implementation test of the AXS-card for a user controlled biometric authentication. 
You are fully free to participate in the test or not.  Only in case you agree with the information and the 
consent drafted below, you are invited to sign and date this form for consent and agreement and to 
return it to AXSionics. 
About the user controlled biometric authentication. The AXS-card has been developed by AXSionics 
Neumarktstrasse 27, CH – 2503 Biel, Switzerland. The AXS-card is designed to provide for increased 
security for accessing identity information in a specific identity management system that works in 
combination with the AXS-card (e.g., an OpenId account). The increased security is effectuated 
because for accessing the identity information, you need not only to possess the AXS-card, but it will 
also be verified (authenticated) whether the actual user is the owner of the card (and not a thief of the 
card). For this purpose, fingerprint of the user of the AXS-card will be verified against previously 
stored fingerprint information of the owner of the card. Hence, the AXS-card provides for a so-called 
‘trusted authentication system with biometrics’. The fingerprint information of the user of the card will 
only be stored on the AXS-card (and nowhere else nor will it leave the card) and the user will decide 
when its fingerprint information will be processed and that it is for use of the card (user controlled FIDIS 
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biometric authentication). A detailed description of the functional and technical requirements of the 
AXS-card as proof of concept of encapsulated biometrics is set forth in FIDIS deliverable D3.10, 
which can find on www.fidis.net.    
About the use of the fingerprint (biometric characteristic). By swiping your fingerprint over the 
biometric sensor on the AXS-card, a feature vector derived from your fingerprint will be stored in 
template format on the card for later verifications. This is also called the enrolment phase. Each time 
you swipe your fingers over the sensor on the card in order to authenticate yourself, a feature vector 
derived from the fingerprint will temporarily be stored for comparison purposes. This is also called the 
verification phase. Data or information about your fingerprints will never leave the card. When 
developing the AXS-card, the privacy and identity protection recommendations as developed in FIDIS 
were applied as much as possible. Because fingerprint information could be used for various purposes, 
including identification and re-use for other purposes as initially meant, the fingerprint information is 
only stored on the card where it is under the control of the user. In addition, not an image of the 
fingerprint, but a representation of the characteristics of the fingerprint in a table form (feature vector) 
with relevant location specifications, a so-called template, is stored on the card, and this only for 
verification purposes. The use of a template should prevent that information relating to health or race 
that may be contained in the fingerprint image would become apparent. However, possible 
information relating to health or race in templates is still to be further researched and may therefore 
not be fully excluded with  the use of such template. Although the field test does certainly not intend 
to process such information relating to health or race, your consent with the possible processing of 
such data will be requested. Furthermore, only the result of the fingerprint verification and comparison 
(‘match’), whether the authentication has been proven successful or not, and no biometric data, will be 
communicated for access purposes to the OpenId identity provider and the management system hosted 
by the service provider. A detailed description of the specific privacy and identity recommendations 
for identity systems using a encapsulated biometric recognition system using fingerprints are set forth 
in FIDIS deliverable D3.10, available on www.fidis.net.   
About the operational aspects of the field test. For testing the AXS-card, it will be required that the 
user generates an OpenID at the OpenId provider Clavid in Switzerland at www.clavid.com. In addition, 
the user will need to register its fingerprint information on the AXS-card and will need to register the 
AXS-card (only, not the fingerprint) with the generated OpenID at Clavid. Detailed instructions on (i) 
how to proceed to get an OpenID, and on (ii) getting started with the AXS-card are hereby provided in 
attachment. Subsequently, the user shall use its OpenID in combination with the AXS-card for the 
FIDIS login at the FIDIS internal webpages and for login at other service providers using OpenID. The 
user shall hereupon provide written feedback to AXSionics about the use of the card by way of answers 
in a questionnaire evaluating the instructions and useability of the AXS-card. More detailed 
instructions on (iii) the use of the AXS-card for accessing any application using OpenID as identity 
management application, as well as (iv) an example of the questionnaire can be found in attachment. 
In order to minimize the data, the user does not need to mention name or any reference number on the 
questionnaire.    
Security measures. By way of security measures implemented, the AXS-card is a tamper resistant 
token where the full processing and storage of the biometric data takes place under the control of you. 
The token hardware and its integrated functions are produced by AXSionics and no one can change 
these functions at reasonable costs. In this sense, the operational functionalities are controlled by 
AXSionics and not by a third party. You, as user of the card decides if you want to use the card. You 
control the physical device with the stored biometric data, which is an autonomous personal token 
with sufficient computing, electrical power and hardware resources to perform the full biometric 
processing in the token. The AXS-card provides cryptographically secure communication channels 
with the central authentication system, for this field text with Clavid. Only digital identity credentials 
without any biometric information can leave the token to confirm a successful verification of the FIDIS 
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identity claim of the user. The whole implementation is protected in a tamper resistant processor on 
the token. Such an implementation reduces to a great extent the threats to a biometric system. 
About the use of the AXS-card and the data processed 
If your are interested and willing to deploy the AXS-card enabling biometric authentication for 
accessing the Fidis internal webpages site and other sites, operating OpenID, for test purposes and in 
the framework of FIDIS deliverable D3.14, you are invited to indicate that you would like to receive 
an AXS-card.  
You are the full and only possessor of the AXS-Card that you will receive and that you should at all 
times keep under your only control.  The AXS-card will store your fingerprint template for later 
verification and authentication purposes when accessing an OpenID application. Upon communication 
between the card and the application server, only the fact that the card has recognized its user will be 
sent by the card to the application server. Traffic data, which is data processed for the authentication 
and the conveyance of the communication, including IP number and the date and time of the 
communications, between the AXS-card, the identity provider Clavid and the service providers using 
OpenId will also be processed. Never give the card to someone else. At the end of the field test, the 
AXS-card will become yours upon your choice, and will not have to be retuned to AXSionics.  
The site which operates the interface with the AXSionics AXS-card for OpenId applications, Clavid, 
Baarerstrasse 2, 6300 Zug, Switzerland, will be a processor in the field test. Clavid will collect and 
process information on behalf and upon further instructions of AXSioncis about the use of a given 
AXS-card, such as the number of authentication attempts including time and IP number, and the 
authentication results transmitted by the card. This information will be communicated to AXSionics 
alone and not to third parties. Furthermore, this information will be processed likely in combination 
with the registered data provided by you in connection with OpenId, which includes a reference to 
your chosen name or pseudonym, your e-mail address, part of your AXS-cardnumber and an OpenId 
identifier. The participating Fidis partner being operator of the Fidis internal Web site, Mobile 
Business & Multilateral Security chair, Güneburgplatz 1, 60629 Frankfurt/Main, Germany, will also 
be a processor in the field test, and will collect and process information on behalf and upon further 
instructions of AXSioncis about the use of a given AXS-card, such as the number of authorized 
accesses and attempts accessing the internal webpages with OpenID, including time and IP number of 
the attempts and an OpenId identifier.  
About the questionnaires relating to the use of the AXS-card  
AXSionics will invite users of the AXS-card to complete a questionnaire (see above). Any and all 
information collected by AXSionics through the questionnaires distributed amongst the users of the 
AXS card and returned by the Fidis partner will be on a no name basis and the information provided 
should in principle not be linkable to a particular user.  
Free, Specific, and informed consent. I understand and agree by signing below that the above 
described categories of personal data, in particular (a) fingerprint (s) in the form of a template 
exclusively stored on the AXS-card under my control for verification and authentication purposes, and 
(b) personal data, including traffic data such as IP number and time and date of communications and 
data relating to (un)successful user controlled biometric authorization with the AXS-card and 
processed by the OpenId identity provider Clavid, in combination with OpenID registration and 
account information, which includes a reference to my chosen name or pseudonym, my e-mail 
address, part of my AXS-cardnumber and an OpenId identifier, and (c) data, including traffic data 
such as IP number and time and date of communications and data relating to access (attempts) to 
OpenID applications of service providers, including the FIDIS internal webpages, and (d) completed 
written answers to the questionnaire about the use of the card sent to AXSionics, will be processed by 
AXSionics, the controller, with registered address in Switzerland, Neumarktstrasse 27, 2503 Biel, 
solely for test and research purposes, in particular for the evaluation of the proof of concept and the 
field demonstrator of the AXS-card as user controlled biometric authentication as part of FIDIS FIDIS 
Future of Identity in the Information Society (No. 507512) 
D3.14 
 
Final , Version: 0.8 
File: fidis_deliverable_wp3_14_V1_0_final 
Page 55 
 
research and as described above and the evaluation of ergonomics and acceptance of the test users 
(market analysis). These personal data, including the traffic data, will only be processed for the 
duration of the test of the AXS-card in the framework of the Fidis project, that will end by [date]. 
The representative of AXSionicis in [country], is [organization] (Contact person: [person], at [Email]). 
The identity provider Clavid, and the Fidis partner being operator of the Fidis internal Web site, 
Mobile Business & Multilateral Security chair, Güneburgplatz 1, 60629 Frankfurt/Main, Germany, 
will be processors of the data and will process that data only on behalf and according to the 
instructions of AXSionics. 
I further understand and agree that, to the extent biometric fingerprint data could reveal information 
concerning health or race, such data exclusively and securely stored on the AXS-card which I shall 
hold all times under my control and any other data provided as answer in the questionnaires, which 
could reveal information relating to health, will be processed, without supervision of a professional of 
the art of healing, but exclusively for the same testing and researching of the biometric authentication 
process, system and usability of the AXS-card. By signing this consent, I expressly agree with the 
processing of such data concerning health or race and which may be contained in a fingerprint 
template, but which will never leave the AXS-card.   
I am informed and take note that I have access to my personal data and the right of correction. For 
such purpose, I can contact the representative of AXSionics in Belgium, ICRI, and its contact person 
mentioned above, or if I would prefer, AXSionics represented by Dr. Lorenz Müller 
lorenz.mueller@axsionics.ch. I can also delete at all times my biometric data from the card. After the end of 
the field test, I agree to either return the AXS-card to AXSionics or, in case I decide to keep the card, 
that the use of the AXS-card is my sole responsibility. 
I understand and agree that personal data relating to the authentication and access (attempts), but 
excluding any and all biometric data which is exclusively and securely stored on the AXS-card, may 
also be sent to third countries, outside the European Union, in particular (only for participants outside 
Switzerland), Switzerland, where AXSionics is registered, as well as where the identity provider, 
Clavid, is registered but which provides an adequate level of protection.  
In using the AXS-card for connecting to service providers of my choice using OpenID,  personal data 
relating to the authentication and access (attempts), including traffic data and data relating to my 
OpenID account information, as mentioned above, but excluding any and all biometric data, may also 
be sent to these service providers (internet sites). The processing of such data falls outside the control 
of AXSionics and solely these service providers (internet sites) are responsible for the processing of 
these data and for which they become controller. I understand and agree that such service providers 
and internet sites using an OpenID access control application, may also be established in countries 
which do not provide for an adequate level of protection, for example in the United States. I 
understand however that I am able to choose such internet sites using OpenId that I want to access at 
my own risk and I agree with any transfer of my data relating to the authentication and access 
(attempts) using the AXS-card to such sites and countries that I would choose and which may not 
provide an adequate level of protection.   
For consent and approval :  
Name, Date, Signature : 
Annexes :  
1. Detailed instructions on (i) how to proceed to get an OpenID, and on (ii) getting started with the 
AXS-card; 
2. Detailed instructions on (iii) the use of the AXS-card for accessing any application using OpenID as 
identity management application, as well as (iv) an example of the questionnaire. FIDIS 
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Controller-Processor Agreement form 
The following generic form was adapted to the data processing organisations of the field test. 
It was signed by Clavid, as provider of the OpenID identifiers, and by JWG University, as 
provider of the access through OpenID to the internal Fidis Web site. AXSionics, as controller 
of the field test was the agreement partner. 
*********************************************************************: 
Agreement 
Between :  
 
AXSionics AG, Neumarkstrasse 27, 2503 Biel, Switzerland, duly represented by Dr. Lorenz Müller, Chief 
Technology Officer and Frank Barker, Chief Executive Officer, 
Hereinafter : the Controller, 
 
And :  
[Data processing operator], duly represented by ___________________________(name and function), 
Hereinafter : the Processor, 
 
Whereas 
Parties are research partners in the FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society) project, a NoE 
(Network of Excellence) supported by the European Union under the 6th Framework Programme for Research 
and Technological Development within the Information Society Technologies (IST) ; 
Parties agreed to collaborate in the field test of the AXS-Card developed by AXSionics, which is a proof of 
concept of encapsulated biometrics as described in FIDIS deliverable D3.10. (hereinafter ‘the fieldtest’); 
The field test is planned for FIDIS deliverable 3.14, the details thereof as further described in the FIDIS 
workplan 4, D3.14. 
AXSionics will take the responsibility for the field test, in particular the acquisition, the management and 
processing of certain personal data, including details about trusted authentication for accessing the OpenID 
identity management, for the above mentioned testing purposes, during the fieldtest, as the controller of the 
personal data; 
The processor agrees to collect, to process and/or to receive personal data on behalf of the controller for the 
above testing purposes in accordance with the instructions of the controller and in compliance with the 
applicable data protection laws; 
Therefore, it has been agreed as follows : 
Article 1 – Definitions 
1.1.  ‘Personal Data’ shall have the same meaning as in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such date (hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC).  Biometric data will not be included in 
the Personal Data to be processed by the processor.  
 ‘the Controller’ shall have the same meaning as in Directive 95/46/EC.  
 ‘the Processor’ shall have the same meaning as in Directive 95/46/EC and means the entity who agrees to 
collect, to process or to receive personal data in relation with the field test, and intended for processing on behalf 
of the Controller in accordance with his instructions, the terms of this Agreement and the applicable data 
protection laws. 
 FIDIS 
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‘Field test’ shall mean the demonstrator field test as described and planned for FIDIS deliverable 3.14 ;  
Article 2 - Subject 
2.1  The Controller requests the Processor, who accepts and agrees, to process on his behalf and in 
compliance with his instructions Personal Data as specified and agreed for the Field test. 
2.2  Parties agree that the specifications and the instructions for the processing of the Personal Data for the 
testing purposes of the Field test are further described by the project proposal for the deliverable 3.14 (attached 
in appendix 1), the internal project documents and additional documentation that parties may agree upon from 
time to time.  
Article 3 – Warranties and obligations of the Controller 
The Controller agrees and warrants that he has instructed and throughout the duration of the Personal Data 
processing services will instruct the Processor to process the Personal Data only on the Controller’s behalf and in 
accordance with the applicable data protection laws. 
The Controller will instruct the Processor on the technical and organizational security measures as specified in 
Appendix 2, to be implemented by the Processor. Parties agree and belief that to the best of their knowledge 
these measures are adequate to protect the Personal Data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their 
implementation.    
Article 4 – Warranties and obligations of the Processor 
4.1.  The Processor agrees and warrants that he has followed and throughout the duration of the Personal 
Data processing services will follow the instructions of the Controller to process the Personal Data and will 
process the Personal Data only on the Controller’s behalf and in accordance with the applicable data protection 
laws. The Processor will process the data only in the manner permitted for the Controller itself. The Processor 
agrees that it shall render the Personal Data anonymous as soon as the research purpose permits it. Until such 
time, the characteristics enabling information concerning personal or material circumstances to be attributed to 
an identified or identifiable individual shall be stored separately.  
4.2.  The Processor further agrees that he shall not apply or use the Personal Data for purposes other than 
specified in this Agreement and shall not communicate the Personal Data to third parties, even not for their 
preservation. The Processor shall at all times keep the Personal Data confidential and request its agents to keep 
the Personal Data confidential as well. 
4.3.  Processor undertakes and warrants that he will implement the technical and organizational security 
measures specified in Appendix 2 before the start of processing the Personal Data and guarantees to take the 
agreed data security measures.   
4.4.  The Processor undertakes and agrees to deal promptly and properly with all inquiries from the 
Controller relating to his processing of the Personal Data for the Field test and to abide by the advice of the 
supervisory authority with regard to the processing of this Personal Data.  
4.5.  The Processor agrees and undertakes to promptly notify the Controller about (1) any legally binding 
request for disclosure of the Personal Data by a law enforcement authority unless prohibited by law, (2) any 
accidental or unauthorized access by third parties, and (3) any request received from the data subjects. 
4.6.  In case of a request received from the data subjects, the Processor shall not  respond to such request 
without prior consultation and the express authorization to do so from the Controller.  
Article 5 – Term and Termination 
The Agreement is concluded for a period and the time required for the testing of the AXS-card in the framework 
of FIDIS. The agreement ends latest at [date]. 
Each party is entitled to terminate this Agreement before the end of the aforementioned period with a notice 
period of one (1) month in case the other party does not comply with its obligations under this Agreement and 
failed to remedy such default within fourteen (14) days after due notice. 
Parties agree that on the termination of the provision of data processing services, the Processor shall, at the 
choice of the Controller, transmit and/or return all the Personal Data collected and/or processed for the Field test 
and all the copies, support and documentation containing Personal Data processed thereof or shall destroy all the FIDIS 
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Personal Data and certify to the Controller that he has done so, unless legislation imposed upon the Processor 
prevents him from returning or destroying such data.  In that case, the Processor warrants that he will guarantee 
the confidentiality of the Personal Data and will not actively process the Personal Data anymore. 
Article 6 – Applicable law, Mediation and Jurisdiction 
6.1.  The laws of the Switzerland, where the Controller is established, shall apply to this Agreement. 
    In case of a dispute, parties will try to solve the issue in an amicable way. 
6.3.  In case a dispute cannot be settled in due time, either party may bring the dispute to a competent court 
in Switzerland. 
 
Done in ______________, on __________ (date), in two copies, each party having received one. 
 
The  Processor      [Signatures] 
 
The  Controller      [Signatures] 
 
Appendices 
 